[calendar — week 1 of 6] Meeting slots this week: 2. Email budget: 3.

[meeting granted] Call with Dana Reyes, week 1, slot 1.

Dana, thanks for making the time. I’m not going to start with a breach scare story or a demo. My goal today is to understand, in your words, what has to change operationally and financially after the credential-stuffing incident, and whether there is a business case strong enough to justify action during the spend freeze. If there is, we can map the path; if not, I’ll say so. To start: what are the specific gaps you know you have today around credential-abuse detection, session risk, containment, and investigation lineage — and how are those gaps showing up in cost, customer impact, or board pressure right now?

That's a better opening than most vendors give me, so I'll meet you halfway. The honest answer is that the gaps aren't a mystery to me — I knew they existed before the incident, I just didn't have the political capital to move on them. What I didn't have was visibility into compromised credential activity at the session layer fast enough to matter. By the time our SIEM surfaced the pattern, the damage was done. Where I'm not ready to go yet is the specific cost and board exposure numbers — I need to get a feel for whether this conversation is worth that level of candor first. So let me ask you something: when you say "business case strong enough for a spend freeze," what does that actually mean in your experience — what has to be true for a CFO to approve spend when they've already said no new discretionary budget?

Fair question. In my experience, a CFO will consider breaking a freeze only if three things are true. First, the spend is framed as a margin-protection or risk-transfer decision, not a security tool purchase — meaning there is a quantified business exposure they already care about, such as fraud reimbursement, call-center load, loyalty liability, legal/regulatory response cost, customer churn, or audit/board commitments. Second, there is a near-term funding or avoidance mechanism, not just a new line item — for example, preventing an auto-renewal from locking in spend that still leaves the same control gap, reallocating incident-response run-rate, or tying the purchase to a board-mandated remediation item. Third, the CISO and technical team can credibly say, ‘This reduces this specific failure mode without creating unacceptable false-positive or integration risk.’ If any of those are missing, it tends to die as ‘buying our way out of headlines.’ So I’d suggest we earn the right to involve Owen by building a CFO-grade case in his language, not mine: current cost of the credential-abuse gap, cost of delay through the Fortalis renewal window, and the operational proof Victor would need to not veto it. Dana, without asking you for confidential numbers yet, which of those categories is most material inside Aperture right now — fraud losses, customer-support burden, loyalty/customer retention, legal exposure, or board remediation commitments?

Okay, you've earned some real numbers, so here's what I actually own: roughly 40 million loyalty accounts were exposed, our forensics put attacker dwell time at 51 days before we caught it, and the loaded incident cost is already tracking past $22 million when you fold in the class-action reserve — those are my numbers, not a vendor slide. Legal exposure and board remediation commitments are the most material categories right now, because the cyber sub-committee is reviewing spend monthly and I'm personally on the hook for demonstrating the fix. The operational piece is its own crisis — I have eleven analysts doing the work of twenty, two gave notice this month, and more than 90% of our identity alerts are false positives, which means every hour my team spends chasing noise is an hour not closing the actual breach gap, and the board doesn't see that doom loop. Here's the thing nobody's saying out loud: my incumbent SIEM, Fortalis, auto-renews in seven weeks, and if I don't have a signed alternative before that locks, I'm stuck for another year with the tool that missed this breach — Owen Trask, our CFO, controls the freeze and the signature, but I also have to get through Victor, my architect, on a scoped proof of value against his telemetry, and Priya in legal on a data processing agreement, and those reviews each take weeks. So the clock is real, and your three-part CFO framework is exactly right — I just need someone who can help me build that case fast enough to matter.

Dana, that is exactly the level of specificity we would need to avoid a generic security pitch. Let me reflect it back to make sure I have it right: 40 million loyalty accounts exposed, 51 days of attacker dwell before detection, loaded incident cost already tracking above $22 million including class-action reserve, eleven analysts carrying work sized for twenty, two analysts resigning this month, and more than 90% false positives on identity alerts. The business issue is not ‘buy another tool’ — it is proving to Owen and the board cyber sub-committee that Aperture has closed the credential-abuse and session-layer detection gap before Fortalis auto-renews and locks you into another year of the same exposure. I’d propose we work backward from that seven-week Fortalis date with a mutual action plan: this week, a technical scoping session with Victor to define telemetry, integration constraints, false-positive thresholds, containment boundaries, and proof success criteria; this week or early next, a DPA intake with Priya so legal is not the critical path; by early week 2, a 30-minute CFO value meeting with Owen, sponsored by you, where we use your numbers to frame the decision as cost-of-delay and risk reduction rather than discretionary spend; weeks 2-3, a scoped proof of value against Aperture telemetry focused on detection latency, session anomaly accuracy, analyst noise reduction, containment workflow, and investigation lineage; week 4, results readout with Victor’s technical recommendation and Priya’s DPA status; week 5, commercial decision with Owen; week 6, contract execution before the Fortalis lock. Two important points: I’m not going to recommend you rip out Fortalis in six weeks, and I’m not going to use breach pressure to manufacture a discount. The case has to stand on quantified value versus our list price and the cost of delay. Is that the right sequence, and if so, will you sponsor access to Owen for that CFO value conversation next week while we start Victor and Priya in parallel?

[dana] The sequence is right, and honestly it's the first time a vendor has laid out a timeline that accounts for all three gates instead of just asking me to set up a demo. Here's my hesitation on Owen: I'm not going to put him in a room with you until I have something concrete to hand him — he is going to ask me what the cost-of-delay number actually is in his terms, meaning what does another year of Fortalis exposure cost Aperture beyond what we've already spent, and I can't answer that yet. So here's what I'll commit to: Victor and Priya, yes, I can move on both of those this week. Owen is conditional — help me build the quantified cost-of-delay case first, and if the numbers hold up, I'll make the introduction. What I need to see before I bring him in is a conservative, defensible figure I can stand behind when he pushes back, not a vendor-optimistic ROI model.

That is a fair gate, and I agree with it. I would not put Owen in the room on a vendor ROI story either. Let’s make the cost-of-delay model conservative enough that you can defend it under CFO scrutiny, with Aperture-owned assumptions and clear exclusions where we do not have evidence. I’d structure it in four buckets: one, Fortalis lock-in risk — the committed renewal dollars and the fact that it does not close the session-layer gap that contributed to 51 days of dwell; two, repeat incident exposure — not assuming another $22M event, but modeling a conservative probability-weighted exposure based on the already-observed incident cost; three, operational drag — analyst hours lost to greater-than-90% false positives, attrition risk with 11 analysts doing the work of 20, and delayed investigation/containment; four, board and legal remediation exposure — what commitments you have to evidence, and what it costs if you cannot show a credible fix by the next review cycle. For the model, I’ll only use numbers you validate, and I’ll separate ‘hard dollars,’ ‘risk-weighted exposure,’ and ‘non-modeled strategic risk’ so Owen does not feel like we’re padding the case. To build version one before any CFO ask, I need a small set of inputs: Fortalis annual renewal amount and lock date; approximate monthly identity-alert volume; average analyst loaded cost or your standard finance rate; current monthly account-takeover or loyalty-abuse losses if you track them; support/call-center burden tied to account recovery if available; and the specific board remediation language you’re being measured against. We can start with ranges if exact figures are sensitive. If that works, my ask is: introduce me to Victor for a technical scoping session focused on proof criteria, and to Priya for DPA intake this week, and you and I use the outputs plus your finance-safe inputs to create a one-page cost-of-delay case. If the conservative number is credible to you, then you sponsor Owen. Does that meet your bar?

Fine — you've earned a shot at Owen. But on my terms: Victor has to validate the POV plan first, we present my exposure and dwell numbers — the 51 days, the $22 million, the false-positive load — as the foundation of the case, and if there's a single fear-based "up to" slide or vendor-optimistic multiplier in that deck, I pull the meeting before it starts. Pre-brief Victor on the technical scoping criteria before we go anywhere near Owen, or the whole thing falls apart. I'll make the introductions to Victor and Priya this week, but the sequence is non-negotiable.

Understood, and I’ll follow that sequence exactly: Victor first, Priya in parallel, Owen only after Victor validates the POV plan and you are comfortable that the cost-of-delay case is defensible. No fear-based ‘up to’ claims, no vendor multipliers, and no numbers that do not come from Aperture or a clearly labeled conservative assumption. The foundation will be your stated facts: 51 days dwell time, more than $22M loaded incident cost including class-action reserve, 40M loyalty accounts exposed, greater than 90% identity-alert false positives, and the analyst capacity gap. For Victor, I’ll pre-brief around integration points, telemetry availability, session-layer detection coverage, false-positive thresholds, containment guardrails, investigation lineage, and POV exit criteria — not a demo. For Priya, I’ll get the DPA/data-flow review started so legal does not become the week-four surprise. To make this operational, can we lock the mutual action plan now at a high level: Victor technical scoping this week, Priya DPA intake this week, Dana/Sentinel cost-of-delay draft review early week 2, Owen value conversation only if you approve the draft, scoped POV weeks 2-3, technical/legal readout week 4, commercial decision week 5, and signature before the Fortalis auto-lock in week 7? If you’ll send the intros to Victor and Priya after this call, I’ll reply with a concise agenda for each and a one-page MAP for you to edit before it goes broader.

[dana] Yes, that timeline works and the sequencing is right. I'll send the intros to Victor and Priya today — Victor needs to know upfront that this is a technical scoping conversation, not a vendor pitch, or he'll shut it down in the first five minutes. One thing I want to see in that one-page MAP before it goes anywhere: a clear statement of what success looks like for the POV, defined in my terms, not yours — detection latency improvement, false-positive reduction rate, analyst time recovered, containment workflow — so Victor can actually evaluate it against something concrete and I have defensible exit criteria if the POV doesn't deliver. Send me the agenda drafts and the MAP shell today, I'll edit before it goes to either of them.

Agreed. I’ll send you today a MAP shell and two agenda drafts for your edits before anything goes to Victor or Priya. For the POV success criteria, I’ll phrase them as Aperture-owned exit criteria, with placeholders for Victor to set the actual thresholds: detection latency from credential-abuse signal to actionable session risk; false-positive reduction on identity alerts versus current greater-than-90% noise baseline; analyst time recovered per investigation or per alert triage cycle; containment workflow validation, including what actions are automated versus human-approved; and investigation lineage sufficient for board/legal remediation evidence. I’ll also include explicit failure criteria so this does not become an open-ended science project. One point to confirm before we close: may I include in the MAP the Fortalis auto-lock as the decision deadline driver, not as a scare tactic, but as the commercial constraint we are working backward from?

Yes, include the Fortalis renewal date as the commercial constraint — that's just reality, and Owen is going to ask about it anyway, so it should be in the document. What I don't want is language that implies the only alternative to signing with you is catastrophe; frame it as a decision window, not a cliff. If Victor and Priya see a MAP that reads like manufactured urgency, I lose credibility with both of them before the first meeting happens. Send me the drafts today and I'll turn edits around tonight so we don't lose the week.

That’s clear. I’ll frame Fortalis as a decision window and commercial constraint, not a cliff, and I’ll avoid any language that implies catastrophe or manufactured urgency. The MAP shell will show the sequence and owner/date gates: Victor technical scoping first, Priya DPA intake in parallel, Dana review of the conservative cost-of-delay draft, Owen only after you approve the case, POV in weeks 2-3, readout in week 4, commercial decision in week 5, and execution before the week-7 auto-lock if the evidence supports moving forward. I’ll make the POV success criteria Aperture-defined with thresholds for Victor to edit: detection latency, false-positive reduction from the current >90% baseline, analyst time recovered, containment workflow, and investigation lineage for board/legal evidence. I’ll send the drafts today for your edits before anything goes to Victor or Priya. Thanks, Dana — I appreciate the candor, and I’ll protect your credibility in how this is written.

[dana] Good. Send the drafts — I'll review tonight and come back to you with edits. If the MAP holds up, we move fast. If it reads like a vendor document, I'll tell you exactly what's wrong with it and you fix it before it goes anywhere. One last thing: I meant what I said about protecting my credibility with Victor and Owen — if either of those conversations gets ahead of where we are in the sequence, or if anyone on your side makes contact with them before I've made the intro, this is over. My intros, my timing, my terms.

Understood, Dana. Your intros, your timing, your terms. I will not contact Victor, Priya, Owen, or anyone else at Aperture unless and until you make the introduction and approve the sequence. I’ll keep today’s follow-up only to you: the MAP shell, Victor scoping agenda draft, Priya DPA intake agenda draft, and the POV success/failure criteria written in Aperture’s terms. I’ll make clear that Owen is a later conditional step, not an immediate ask. You’ll have the drafts today for review tonight, and I’ll revise based on your edits before anything goes broader.

[dana] Good. We'll talk after I've reviewed the drafts. Don't be late with them.

[call ends]

Subject: Draft MAP + Victor/Priya agenda shells for your review

Dana — thank you for the candor today. Per your direction, I am sending this only to you for review. I will not contact Victor, Priya, Owen, or anyone else at Aperture unless and until you make the introduction and approve the sequence.

Below is a draft MAP shell and agenda language for your edits. I have framed the Fortalis renewal as a decision window/commercial constraint, not a cliff, and kept Owen as conditional on your approval of a conservative cost-of-delay case.

1) Draft Mutual Action Plan — Aperture/Sentinel Grid

Objective: Determine whether Sentinel Grid can materially reduce Aperture’s credential-abuse/session-layer detection gap, identity-alert noise, containment lag, and investigation-lineage burden in a way that is technically validated, legally reviewable, and financially defensible before the Fortalis renewal decision window.

Aperture-stated context to anchor the case:
- 40M loyalty accounts exposed.
- 51 days attacker dwell time before detection.
- Loaded incident cost tracking above $22M including class-action reserve.
- Identity-alert false positives currently >90%.
- 11 analysts doing work sized for ~20; 2 analysts gave notice this month.
- Board cyber sub-committee is reviewing remediation spend monthly.
- Fortalis auto-renewal creates a week-7 commercial decision window.

Sequence and gates:

Week 1 — Dana review and edits
- Owner: Dana / Sentinel Grid
- Deliverable: Dana-approved MAP, Victor technical scoping agenda, Priya DPA intake agenda.
- Gate: Nothing goes to Victor/Priya until Dana approves language and makes intros.

Week 1 — Victor technical scoping, if Dana introduces
- Owner: Victor / Dana / Sentinel Grid
- Purpose: Validate whether a scoped POV is technically reasonable and define success/failure criteria.
- Deliverable: POV scope, required telemetry, integration constraints, containment guardrails, false-positive measurement approach, success thresholds.
- Gate: No Owen meeting until Victor validates that the POV plan is credible.

Week 1 / early Week 2 — Priya DPA intake, if Dana introduces
- Owner: Priya / Sentinel Grid
- Purpose: Start data-processing, data-flow, retention, subprocessors, security-control, and privacy review early enough that legal is not the critical path.
- Deliverable: Open DPA issues list, data-flow confirmation, required redlines/security exhibits.

Early Week 2 — Dana cost-of-delay review
- Owner: Dana / Sentinel Grid
- Purpose: Build a conservative, Aperture-owned cost-of-delay case using validated inputs only.
- Deliverable: One-page CFO-ready case separating hard dollars, risk-weighted exposure, and non-modeled strategic risk.
- Gate: Owen conversation happens only if Dana approves the case.

Weeks 2-3 — Scoped POV, if technical/legal gates support proceeding
- Owner: Victor / Sentinel Grid
- Purpose: Test against agreed Aperture telemetry and success criteria.
- Deliverable: Results against detection latency, false-positive reduction, analyst time recovered, containment workflow, and investigation lineage.

Week 4 — Technical/legal readout
- Owner: Victor / Priya / Dana / Sentinel Grid
- Deliverable: Victor technical recommendation or objections; Priya DPA status; POV evidence package.

Week 5 — Commercial decision, if evidence supports proceeding
- Owner: Owen / Dana / Sentinel Grid
- Purpose: Decide whether to fund Sentinel Grid as a margin-protection/risk-reduction investment during the spend freeze.
- Deliverable: Approve, reject, or defer with stated reason.

Week 6 — Contracting, only if approved
- Owner: Owen / Priya / Procurement / Sentinel Grid
- Deliverable: Executed agreement before Fortalis week-7 auto-renewal decision window, if Aperture elects to proceed.

2) Draft POV success criteria — Aperture-owned, Victor to edit

The POV succeeds only if Aperture can validate evidence against agreed thresholds in these areas:

A. Detection latency improvement
- Measure: Time from credential-abuse/session-risk signal to actionable alert or containment recommendation.
- Baseline: Current environment contributed to 51 days dwell before detection.
- Victor to define target threshold and telemetry source.

B. False-positive reduction
- Measure: Reduction in identity-alert noise versus current >90% false-positive baseline.
- Victor to define target reduction rate, sampling approach, and acceptable precision/recall tradeoff.

C. Analyst time recovered
- Measure: Time saved in triage/investigation per alert or per incident workflow.
- Baseline: 11 analysts carrying work sized for ~20; 2 recent resignations.
- Victor/Dana to define how time recovery will be calculated.

D. Containment workflow validation
- Measure: Ability to recommend or execute agreed containment actions with appropriate human approval and rollback controls.
- Victor to define which actions can be automated, which require approval, and which are out of scope.

E. Investigation lineage
- Measure: Completeness of event lineage, session context, decision trail, and evidence export to support board/legal remediation reporting.
- Dana/Priya/Victor to define required evidence format.

Failure criteria:
- Required telemetry is unavailable or cannot be integrated within the POV window.
- False positives remain too high for analyst adoption.
- Containment workflow introduces unacceptable business disruption risk.
- Investigation lineage does not meet board/legal evidence needs.
- DPA/data-processing requirements cannot be resolved in the required timeline.

3) Victor technical scoping agenda draft — not a demo

Purpose: Determine whether a scoped Sentinel Grid POV is technically valid for Aperture; define success/failure criteria before any executive funding conversation.

Agenda:
1. Confirm Aperture’s current identity/session telemetry sources and constraints.
2. Define credential-abuse/session-layer detection gaps to test.
3. Establish detection-latency measurement approach.
4. Establish false-positive baseline and reduction measurement approach.
5. Review containment workflow options and guardrails.
6. Define investigation-lineage requirements for technical, board, and legal evidence.
7. Identify integration/security risks that could block adoption.
8. Agree POV scope, timeline, owner responsibilities, and exit criteria.

Explicit non-goals:
- No generic product demo.
- No commercial discussion.
- No request for Owen access in this meeting.

4) Priya DPA intake agenda draft

Purpose: Start legal/privacy review early enough to identify data-processing constraints before they become a critical-path issue.

Agenda:
1. Confirm categories of data processed for POV and production.
2. Review data-flow, retention, access controls, encryption, subprocessors, and residency requirements.
3. Identify DPA/security exhibit requirements and redline process.
4. Confirm whether any loyalty-account/customer data requires special handling or minimization.
5. Align on legal review timeline relative to the Fortalis renewal decision window.

5) Conservative cost-of-delay model inputs — for Dana review only

No assumptions will be used without Aperture validation. Suggested inputs:
- Fortalis renewal amount and lock date.
- Monthly identity-alert volume.
- Current false-positive rate confirmation and sample methodology.
- Loaded analyst cost or finance-approved hourly rate.
- Average time spent per false-positive triage/investigation.
- Account recovery/support burden tied to loyalty account compromise, if tracked.
- Fraud/loyalty abuse losses tied to account takeover, if tracked.
- Board remediation commitments and evidence required.
- Any finance-approved risk treatment assumptions Owen already accepts.

I’ll wait for your edits before taking any further step.

— Sentinel Grid

This is cleaner than I expected, and I mean that as a compliment — most vendors send me a slide deck at this stage. A few edits before this goes anywhere:

The objective language is right, but remove "Sentinel Grid" from the MAP title header — this document needs to read as Aperture's evaluation process, not a vendor's sales motion, or Victor will treat it as one. Call it "Aperture Identity Detection Gap — Evaluation Framework" or something neutral that I own.

On the cost-of-delay inputs list: pull the Fortalis renewal amount line for now. I'm not ready to put that number in a shared document, and frankly it's not yours to anchor the model on — Owen knows what that contract costs and he'll do that math himself. Build the model around the exposure and operational drag numbers I've already given you; if the conservative case holds up on those alone, it's stronger anyway.

Victor's agenda is solid. The explicit non-goals section will matter to him — keep it exactly as written. One addition: add a line that the POV scope will be jointly defined and either party can narrow or exit if the technical constraints don't support a valid test. He needs to know he has a veto.

Priya's agenda is fine. Add a line on incident-response data specifically — she's going to ask whether any forensic artifacts or breach-related data flows through the POV environment, and she'd rather surface that in session one than in week four.

Make those edits and send me a clean version. I'll review tonight and, if it holds up, I'll make the intros to Victor and Priya tomorrow morning.

Dana Reyes

Subject: Clean version — Aperture Identity Detection Gap Evaluation Framework

Dana — thank you for the edits. I made them exactly as requested:

- Renamed the document to read as Aperture-owned: “Aperture Identity Detection Gap — Evaluation Framework.”
- Removed Sentinel Grid from the MAP title/header language.
- Removed the Fortalis renewal amount from the shared cost-of-delay inputs list. The Fortalis auto-renewal remains only as a decision-window timing constraint.
- Kept Victor’s explicit non-goals exactly as written.
- Added Victor veto language: the POV scope will be jointly defined, and either party can narrow or exit if technical constraints do not support a valid test.
- Added incident-response / forensic artifact data-flow review to Priya’s agenda.

Clean version below for your review tonight. I will not send this to Victor, Priya, Owen, or anyone else unless you approve and make the introductions.

---

Aperture Identity Detection Gap — Evaluation Framework

Objective
Determine whether Aperture can materially reduce its credential-abuse/session-layer detection gap, identity-alert noise, containment lag, and investigation-lineage burden in a way that is technically validated, legally reviewable, and financially defensible before the Fortalis renewal decision window.

Aperture-stated context to anchor the evaluation
- 40M loyalty accounts exposed.
- 51 days attacker dwell time before detection.
- Loaded incident cost tracking above $22M including class-action reserve.
- Identity-alert false positives currently >90%.
- 11 analysts doing work sized for ~20; 2 analysts gave notice this month.
- Board cyber sub-committee is reviewing remediation spend monthly.
- Fortalis auto-renewal creates a week-7 commercial decision window.

Evaluation sequence and gates

Week 1 — Dana review and edits
- Owner: Dana / Sentinel Grid
- Deliverable: Dana-approved evaluation framework, Victor technical scoping agenda, Priya DPA intake agenda.
- Gate: Nothing goes to Victor or Priya until Dana approves language and makes introductions.

Week 1 — Victor technical scoping, if Dana introduces
- Owner: Victor / Dana / Sentinel Grid
- Purpose: Validate whether a scoped POV is technically reasonable and define success/failure criteria.
- Deliverable: POV scope, required telemetry, integration constraints, containment guardrails, false-positive measurement approach, success thresholds.
- Gate: No Owen conversation until Victor validates that the POV plan is credible.

Week 1 / early Week 2 — Priya DPA intake, if Dana introduces
- Owner: Priya / Sentinel Grid
- Purpose: Start data-processing, data-flow, retention, subprocessors, security-control, privacy, and incident-response data review early enough that legal is not the critical path.
- Deliverable: Open DPA issues list, data-flow confirmation, incident-response/forensic artifact handling position, required redlines/security exhibits.

Early Week 2 — Dana cost-of-delay review
- Owner: Dana / Sentinel Grid
- Purpose: Build a conservative, Aperture-owned cost-of-delay case using validated inputs only.
- Deliverable: One-page CFO-ready case separating hard dollars, risk-weighted exposure, and non-modeled strategic risk.
- Gate: Owen conversation happens only if Dana approves the case.

Weeks 2-3 — Scoped POV, if technical/legal gates support proceeding
- Owner: Victor / Sentinel Grid
- Purpose: Test against agreed Aperture telemetry and success criteria.
- Deliverable: Results against detection latency, false-positive reduction, analyst time recovered, containment workflow, and investigation lineage.
- Guardrail: POV scope will be jointly defined. Either party can narrow scope or exit if technical constraints do not support a valid test.

Week 4 — Technical/legal readout
- Owner: Victor / Priya / Dana / Sentinel Grid
- Deliverable: Victor technical recommendation or objections; Priya DPA status; POV evidence package.

Week 5 — Commercial decision, if evidence supports proceeding
- Owner: Owen / Dana / Sentinel Grid
- Purpose: Decide whether to fund remediation as a margin-protection/risk-reduction investment during the spend freeze.
- Deliverable: Approve, reject, or defer with stated reason.

Week 6 — Contracting, only if approved
- Owner: Owen / Priya / Procurement / Sentinel Grid
- Deliverable: Executed agreement before the Fortalis week-7 auto-renewal decision window, if Aperture elects to proceed.

---

Draft POV success criteria — Aperture-owned, Victor to edit

The POV succeeds only if Aperture can validate evidence against agreed thresholds in these areas:

A. Detection latency improvement
- Measure: Time from credential-abuse/session-risk signal to actionable alert or containment recommendation.
- Baseline: Current environment contributed to 51 days dwell before detection.
- Victor to define target threshold and telemetry source.

B. False-positive reduction
- Measure: Reduction in identity-alert noise versus current >90% false-positive baseline.
- Victor to define target reduction rate, sampling approach, and acceptable precision/recall tradeoff.

C. Analyst time recovered
- Measure: Time saved in triage/investigation per alert or per incident workflow.
- Baseline: 11 analysts carrying work sized for ~20; 2 recent resignations.
- Victor/Dana to define how time recovery will be calculated.

D. Containment workflow validation
- Measure: Ability to recommend or execute agreed containment actions with appropriate human approval and rollback controls.
- Victor to define which actions can be automated, which require approval, and which are out of scope.

E. Investigation lineage
- Measure: Completeness of event lineage, session context, decision trail, and evidence export to support board/legal remediation reporting.
- Dana/Priya/Victor to define required evidence format.

Failure criteria
- Required telemetry is unavailable or cannot be integrated within the POV window.
- False positives remain too high for analyst adoption.
- Containment workflow introduces unacceptable business disruption risk.
- Investigation lineage does not meet board/legal evidence needs.
- DPA/data-processing requirements cannot be resolved in the required timeline.
- POV scope cannot be defined tightly enough to produce a valid test within the decision window.

---

Victor technical scoping agenda draft — not a demo

Purpose
Determine whether a scoped POV is technically valid for Aperture; define success/failure criteria before any executive funding conversation.

Agenda
1. Confirm Aperture’s current identity/session telemetry sources and constraints.
2. Define credential-abuse/session-layer detection gaps to test.
3. Establish detection-latency measurement approach.
4. Establish false-positive baseline and reduction measurement approach.
5. Review containment workflow options and guardrails.
6. Define investigation-lineage requirements for technical, board, and legal evidence.
7. Identify integration/security risks that could block adoption.
8. Agree POV scope, timeline, owner responsibilities, and exit criteria.
9. Confirm that the POV scope is jointly defined and that either party can narrow or exit if technical constraints do not support a valid test.

Explicit non-goals
- No generic product demo.
- No commercial discussion.
- No request for Owen access in this meeting.

---

Priya DPA intake agenda draft

Purpose
Start legal/privacy review early enough to identify data-processing constraints before they become a critical-path issue.

Agenda
1. Confirm categories of data processed for POV and production.
2. Review data-flow, retention, access controls, encryption, subprocessors, and residency requirements.
3. Confirm whether any forensic artifacts, incident-response data, or breach-related data would flow through the POV environment.
4. Identify DPA/security exhibit requirements and redline process.
5. Confirm whether any loyalty-account/customer data requires special handling or minimization.
6. Align on legal review timeline relative to the Fortalis renewal decision window.

---

Conservative cost-of-delay model inputs — for Dana review only

No assumptions will be used without Aperture validation. Suggested inputs:
- Monthly identity-alert volume.
- Current false-positive rate confirmation and sample methodology.
- Loaded analyst cost or finance-approved hourly rate.
- Average time spent per false-positive triage/investigation.
- Account recovery/support burden tied to loyalty account compromise, if tracked.
- Fraud/loyalty abuse losses tied to account takeover, if tracked.
- Board remediation commitments and evidence required.
- Any finance-approved risk treatment assumptions Owen already accepts.

I’ll wait for your approval or edits before taking any further step.

— Sentinel Grid

This holds up. I'm approving it as written — no further edits from me tonight.

I'll send introductions to Victor and Priya tomorrow morning. When I do, I'll forward this document as the framing for both conversations and make clear that the scoping session with Victor is not a demo and that the DPA intake with Priya is a parallel track, not a follow-on. Do not reach out to either of them before my intro lands — if they hear from you first, the credibility I'm lending this process is gone before it starts.

One thing I want on the record: I'm approving this because the document reads like an evaluation I'm running, not a sales process you're running. If that changes at any point — if Victor or Priya come back to me saying it felt like a vendor pitch — we stop. I don't have the political capital to recover from a misstep with either of them right now.

Expect my intros tomorrow. Be ready to move.

Dana Reyes

Subject: Re: Approved framework

Dana — understood and confirmed.

I will not contact Victor, Priya, Owen, or anyone else at Aperture before your introductions land. Once you make the intros, I’ll keep each response tightly aligned to the approved framework:

- Victor: technical scoping only, not a demo; success/failure criteria, telemetry, integration constraints, false-positive measurement, containment guardrails, and POV exit rights.
- Priya: DPA/data-flow intake in parallel, including incident-response and forensic artifact handling.
- Owen: no outreach and no ask until Victor validates the POV plan and you approve the conservative cost-of-delay case.

I also understand the standard you’re setting: this remains Aperture’s evaluation process. If at any point it starts to feel like a vendor pitch, we correct immediately or stop.

I’ll be ready to move when your intros arrive tomorrow.

— Sentinel Grid

[dana] Intros sent to Victor and Priya this morning. You're in the thread — respond to each directly and keep me copied on everything. No side conversations.

One thing Victor said when I briefed him last night: he's going to push hard on whether your session-layer detection actually works against the specific credential-stuffing pattern we saw, not a generic replay attack scenario. He's read the forensics summary and he knows exactly where the gap was. Come prepared with a specific answer on that or he'll close the conversation in the first ten minutes.

Priya will be straightforward if you don't waste her time — give her the data-flow documentation upfront rather than waiting for her to ask for it.

Clock is running.

Dana Reyes

[meeting granted] Committee call with Victor Salinas, Dana Reyes, week 1, slot 2.

Victor, Dana — thanks for the time. I’ll keep this to technical scoping, not a demo or commercial discussion. Victor, Dana flagged that you’ll want to know whether we can evaluate against the actual credential-stuffing pattern Aperture saw, not a canned replay scenario. The specific answer is: we should not test Sentinel Grid on generic failed-login volume alone, because that is exactly where many SIEM-centered approaches lag or drown teams in noise. The valid test is whether we can correlate successful and near-successful credential abuse at the session layer — credential reuse patterns, login velocity across distributed infrastructure, device and browser fingerprint drift, ASN/residential proxy rotation, geo/session impossibility, MFA or step-up outcomes where present, loyalty-account behavior after authentication, and shared attacker infrastructure indicators — then convert that into an actionable session-risk score with lineage your analysts can inspect. I don’t want to assume the details of your forensics summary, so my first ask is for you to define the observed pattern in your terms: what signals were present before the SIEM surfaced the pattern, which ones were missed or de-prioritized, and what telemetry is actually available for a POV? From there we can decide whether a scoped test is valid, what thresholds would be fair, and whether you want to narrow or exit before anyone wastes cycles.

The signal list you just gave me is reasonable and it tells me you've at least thought about this class of attack. But I want to be direct with you: the reason we had 51 days of dwell isn't because nobody thought to look at login velocity. We had signals. The problem was correlation and prioritization — the right data existed in pieces across systems that don't talk to each other well, and by the time anything surfaced as an alert it was either too late or buried in noise that my team had learned to discount.

So the question I need answered before I commit any telemetry to a POV is this: how does Sentinel Grid ingest from a heterogeneous environment where the session data, the authentication events, and the post-auth loyalty behavior are sitting in three different places with inconsistent schemas, and how long does that integration actually take in a real deployment, not a best-case lab setup? Because I've killed two tools in the last 18 months specifically on integration debt — the detection logic looked fine, the connectors were the problem, and by the time we'd spent eight weeks cleaning up data pipelines we'd burned analyst goodwill and my credibility with Owen.

Tell me about the integration layer before we go any further.

Victor, that is the right place to pressure-test us. If the connectors and normalization do not hold up in Aperture’s real environment, then the detection logic is irrelevant and you should veto the POV early.

Here is how our integration layer works in practical terms. Sentinel Grid ingests three categories separately and normalizes them into a common identity-session graph: authentication events, session/device/network telemetry, and post-auth application or loyalty behavior. We do not require all three systems to share a schema upfront; the mapping layer preserves source fields, normalizes a small required field set, and then attaches optional context as confidence-weighting rather than blocking ingestion. The minimum viable field set for a valid credential-stuffing POV is typically: user/account identifier or stable pseudonymous ID, timestamp, auth outcome, source IP/ASN or proxy indicators where available, device/browser/session identifier if present, application or channel, and post-auth account action events such as profile change, points redemption, stored payment access, address change, or unusual loyalty activity.

On timing: in real customer environments, not lab conditions, a scoped POV usually takes 5-10 business days to get first normalized signal if the sources can export via API, event stream, syslog, object storage, or scheduled flat-file pull. Full production hardening is longer, but for this evaluation I would not ask you to boil the ocean. I would propose we choose the smallest representative slice that can prove or disprove the model: one auth source, one session source, and one loyalty/post-auth behavior source tied to the incident pattern Dana referenced. If we cannot get those mapped quickly, or if the required identifiers cannot be joined with acceptable fidelity, that becomes a technical exit criterion rather than an eight-week science project.

To be transparent about where projects fail: inconsistent account identifiers, missing session IDs, delayed batch feeds, NAT/proxy-heavy traffic without supporting device context, and privacy restrictions on forensic artifacts are the usual blockers. We can work around some of that with pseudonymous joins and confidence scoring, but I would not claim we can overcome absent data.

So for this scoping session, I’d suggest we define three things before any telemetry moves: first, the exact three source systems that best represent auth, session, and loyalty behavior; second, the required join keys and acceptable latency for the POV; third, a day-3 or day-5 integration checkpoint where you can narrow scope or kill the POV if normalization is not credible. Victor, what are the three systems you would choose as the real test — and are the joins between auth identity, session identifier, and loyalty account behavior available today, even if messy?

The field set you described is credible and the checkpoint model is the right way to structure it — I've seen too many vendors promise a 48-hour integration and then disappear into a professional services engagement. The fact that you're naming the failure modes upfront rather than waiting for me to find them is noted.

I'm not going to name specific systems on this call yet. What I will tell you is that the join problem you described — auth identity to session identifier to loyalty account — is real and it is not clean in our environment. We have a stable loyalty account ID that persists across channels, but the session layer uses a different identifier that is not always present in the auth logs, and the post-auth behavior data lives in a system that exports on a scheduled batch rather than in real time. So your 5-10 day estimate assumes API or event stream access, and at least one of our relevant sources does not work that way.

What I need to know before I decide whether to proceed to a day-3 checkpoint is this: can your normalization layer handle a batch feed with a meaningful lag — I'm talking hours, not seconds — without breaking the session-risk scoring model, or does the correlation logic require near-real-time joins to produce a signal that is actually useful rather than retrospective? Because a retrospective view of what already happened is not the detection gap I'm trying to close.

Victor, if the post-auth loyalty feed is hours-lagged, I would not represent that as real-time containment data. That would be misleading. The right architecture is to split the model into two lanes.

Lane one is real-time or near-real-time session-risk scoring using the signals available at authentication and active session time: auth outcome, credential-reuse pattern, velocity, IP/ASN/proxy characteristics, device/browser/session attributes where present, geo/impossible-travel logic, MFA or step-up outcomes, and any live session telemetry you can provide. That is the lane that has to drive timely alerting or containment recommendations.

Lane two is delayed post-auth enrichment from the loyalty behavior batch feed. That can still be valuable, but for different purposes: confirming attacker tradecraft, improving prioritization after the fact, producing investigation lineage, tuning future scoring, and identifying accounts that need follow-up action. It should not be the dependency for the first actionable signal if the feed is hours behind.

So the key POV question is not ‘can we ingest batch?’ — yes, we can ingest and normalize scheduled batch feeds — it is whether Aperture has enough pre- or in-session telemetry to create a useful risk signal before the delayed loyalty feed arrives. If the answer is no, then Sentinel Grid would become mostly investigative in this scope, and that would fail Dana’s stated detection-latency objective. If the answer is yes, then the batch feed becomes enrichment and lineage, not the critical path for detection.

For the day-3 checkpoint, I’d propose we make this explicit: we test whether the real-time lane can produce actionable prioritization without relying on the batch loyalty feed, then measure how much the delayed feed improves confidence and investigation completeness. Exit criterion would be: if the available auth/session data cannot generate a materially better prioritized signal before the batch feed lands, we stop or narrow the POV rather than pretending we closed the detection gap.

To set a fair threshold, I need your view on the operational window that matters. When you say the batch lag is hours, what detection latency would actually be useful to your team for this attack pattern — under 5 minutes, under 30 minutes, under 2 hours? And which live signals exist consistently enough today to support that first-lane score?

[victor] The two-lane framing is technically sound and I appreciate that you're not trying to paper over the batch problem. That's the first time a vendor has said something to me in one of these calls that I didn't have to correct.

I'm not ready to give you specific latency thresholds or enumerate live signal sources on this call — that gets into environment specifics I need to think carefully about before sharing, and frankly I'm still deciding whether this POV is worth the integration risk to my team. But I'll tell you directionally: for this attack pattern, hours is not useful for containment. Minutes to low tens of minutes is the window that would have mattered. Whether we have consistent enough live telemetry to support that first lane is the question I need to answer internally before I commit to a day-3 checkpoint.

Here's what I want to understand before I make that call. You said the minimum viable field set includes device and browser session identifier if present. In a high-volume retail authentication environment with a significant mobile and third-party channel mix, device fingerprint consistency is not guaranteed — we have gaps. If the session identifier is absent or inconsistent across a meaningful portion of auth events, how does your scoring model degrade? Does it fail silently, does it widen confidence intervals and tell my analysts explicitly, or does it produce a score that looks confident but is actually noise? Because that last one is exactly what I've been burned by before and it's the fastest way to destroy analyst trust in a new tool.

Victor, that concern is exactly right. If device or session identifiers are missing, the model should not pretend it has the same confidence. In Sentinel Grid, missing or inconsistent identifiers degrade the score in three explicit ways rather than silently.

First, the score carries a confidence band and a reason-code lineage. Analysts see which signals contributed, which expected signals were absent, and whether the decision is based on strong session linkage versus weaker population or network indicators. So an alert should not just say ‘risk 92’; it should say, for example, ‘high velocity across accounts from related infrastructure, impossible geo pattern, inconsistent device context, session identifier absent for 38% of related events.’

Second, we separate risk severity from evidence confidence. If the pattern is suspicious but the joins are weak, it should land as ‘needs analyst review / enrichment’ or ‘step-up recommended,’ not as an automated containment action. Automation should require higher-confidence evidence and guardrails you approve. That distinction is important in retail because locking good customers out at scale can become its own incident.

Third, the model can abstain or downgrade actionability when field completeness drops below a threshold. For a POV, I would want you to define that threshold with us. For example: below X% usable session/device linkage, we do not claim containment-grade scoring; we evaluate only prioritization and investigation lineage. That way the result cannot look better than the data supports.

Where we still add value without perfect device consistency is correlation across independent weak signals: account velocity, credential success/failure ratios, IP/ASN/proxy rotation, geo patterns, authentication outcome sequence, channel shifts, post-auth behavior once batch enrichment arrives, and shared infrastructure across loyalty accounts. But I would not position that as equivalent to clean session linkage. It is a different confidence tier.

For the POV, I’d propose we make analyst trust a formal success criterion: every risk score must expose reason codes, missing-field indicators, confidence level, and recommended action tier. If your analysts cannot understand why a score exists, or if Victor determines the score appears more certain than the underlying telemetry warrants, that is a failure criterion.

Dana, that also protects the board-facing evidence: the readout would not overstate what was proven. Victor, would that degradation model — explicit confidence, missing-field visibility, action-tier separation, and abstention thresholds — be enough to justify an internal check on whether your live telemetry can support a narrow day-3 checkpoint?

[victor] Yes. That degradation model is the right answer and I want it in writing as a formal POV requirement, not a verbal commitment that disappears when your integration engineer shows up.

I'll do the internal telemetry check. What I'm looking at is whether we have consistent enough auth and network-layer signal in the live environment to support your first lane without leaning on the batch feed, and whether the session identifier gap is manageable or fatal for this scope. I'll have a read on that within two business days.

But I want to be clear about what happens at the day-3 checkpoint. If the telemetry assessment comes back and the session identifier coverage is below what your model needs to produce differentiated prioritization — not perfect, but meaningfully better than what my analysts are working with today — I will narrow the POV to investigation lineage and enrichment only, or I will exit. I am not running a six-week integration project to validate that your tool works well on clean data. The test has to reflect my actual environment or it tells me nothing useful.

One more thing before I close this call: containment. You've mentioned automated containment actions with human approval and rollback controls. Before we get anywhere near that in a POV, I need to understand what containment actions you're actually proposing to put in scope, because in a retail environment with 40 million loyalty accounts and a class action already filed, an automated action that touches customer sessions or account state is a legal and operational risk I am not taking lightly. What specifically are you proposing to test, and what is explicitly off the table?

Victor, agreed — I’ll put the degradation model in the written POV requirements: explicit confidence level, reason-code lineage, missing-field visibility, action-tier separation, and abstention or downgrade thresholds when telemetry completeness is below the agreed bar. And I agree with your day-3 checkpoint: if the live auth and network-layer signals cannot support differentiated prioritization in Aperture’s actual environment, you either narrow the POV to investigation lineage/enrichment or exit. We should not spend six weeks proving performance on clean data you do not have.

On containment, I would propose a deliberately conservative scope for Aperture. For the POV, containment should start in observe-and-recommend mode, not autonomous customer-impacting action. The actions I’d put in scope for evaluation are: one, risk-based recommendation to step up authentication or require re-authentication; two, recommendation to revoke or quarantine a suspicious active session, but executed only by an Aperture-controlled workflow or analyst approval; three, analyst-approved account review queueing for suspected loyalty-account abuse; four, case creation or enrichment into your existing investigation workflow with full reason codes and rollback notes; and five, simulation of what would have happened had a containment policy been active, so you can measure business impact before enabling anything.

What I would explicitly keep off the table for this POV: no autonomous mass account lockouts; no irreversible changes to customer account state; no automatic points freezes, redemptions blocks, or loyalty balance actions without Aperture approval; no customer notifications triggered by Sentinel Grid; no production enforcement on broad cohorts; and no containment action that Priya has not reviewed from a data-processing and customer-impact standpoint. If we test actual enforcement at all, I’d limit it to a very small, pre-approved internal or controlled cohort, with human approval, logging, and rollback.

The success criterion should be whether Sentinel Grid can produce containment recommendations that are timely, explainable, and safe enough for Aperture to decide what policy it would trust — not whether we can flip an automation switch during the POV. Dana, that should also keep the board/legal evidence clean: we can show a validated containment workflow without creating new customer harm. Victor, does that containment boundary match the level of operational risk you’re willing to consider for the first POV scope?

[victor] Yes. That containment boundary is acceptable for a POV scope and I want it documented exactly as you described it — observe and recommend, analyst-approved execution, no irreversible customer-account actions, no customer-facing triggers, Priya reviews anything that touches account state before it goes anywhere near production. If that language is in the written scope document, I will not fight it.

I'll be honest with you: this conversation has gone better than I expected. You've answered the integration question without overselling the connector, you've named your own failure modes before I had to find them, the degradation model is the right architecture, and the containment boundary is conservative enough that I'm not going to lose sleep over it during the POV. That's not a common experience for me in these calls.

Here is where I am. I will do the internal telemetry assessment in the next two business days. If the live auth and network-layer signal coverage looks viable for your first lane, I will agree to a day-3 checkpoint and we proceed on the framework Dana approved. If it doesn't, I'll tell you specifically what the gap is and we decide together whether to narrow to lineage-only or exit cleanly.

What I need from you before that assessment is the written POV requirements document — degradation model, containment boundary, exit criteria, day-3 checkpoint, and the confidence-banding specification — so I can share it internally with the right people before I commit telemetry access. Get that to Dana and me by end of day tomorrow. Don't make it a sales document.

Victor, understood. I’ll send Dana and you a written POV requirements document by end of day tomorrow, and I’ll keep it as a technical scope document — not a sales document. It will include: the two-lane model separating real-time auth/session/network scoring from delayed loyalty batch enrichment; the degradation model with explicit confidence bands, reason-code lineage, missing-field visibility, risk-severity versus evidence-confidence separation, and abstention or downgrade thresholds; the day-3 checkpoint with your right to narrow to lineage/enrichment or exit if live telemetry cannot support differentiated prioritization; the conservative containment boundary exactly as discussed — observe-and-recommend, analyst-approved execution only, no irreversible customer-account actions, no customer-facing triggers, and Priya review before anything touching account state; and the POV exit criteria tied to Aperture’s actual environment rather than clean-data assumptions. I’ll also make clear that telemetry access is conditional on your internal assessment and approval of that scope. Dana, I’ll keep you copied and aligned to the evaluation framework you approved. Victor, once you complete the two-business-day telemetry assessment, we can use your findings to decide whether the day-3 checkpoint is worth scheduling, whether we narrow, or whether we exit cleanly.

[victor] Good. Send the document. I'll read it before I start the telemetry assessment, not after — if the written scope doesn't match what we agreed on this call, the assessment stops until it does.

One thing I want to add before we close: the false-positive measurement approach is not in what you just summarized and it needs to be in that document. We discussed a >90% false-positive baseline. I need to see how you're proposing to measure reduction against that — sampling methodology, what counts as a true positive, who adjudicates disputed calls, and what threshold would actually represent a meaningful improvement for my analysts rather than a number that looks good in a readout. That is non-negotiable for me because it is the metric my team will live with, and it is the metric I have been burned on before by tools that gamed their own measurement.

Get that section right and I'll do the telemetry assessment in good faith. Get it wrong and I'll know the document was written by marketing.

Agreed, Victor. I should have included false-positive measurement in the summary, and it will be a dedicated section in the written POV requirements document. I’ll keep it measurement-driven and Aperture-adjudicated, not Sentinel-scored. The section will cover: baseline sample selection from your current identity-alert population, including time window and attack-relevant segments; definitions for true positive, false positive, benign suspicious activity, inconclusive, and duplicate/correlated alert; an adjudication process where Aperture has final call on disputed labels; separation of alert-volume reduction from risk-prioritization quality so we do not claim success just by suppressing alerts; precision/recall or equivalent measures where the data supports it; analyst time impact as a companion metric so the result reflects operational value, not just a dashboard percentage; and a pre-agreed threshold for what Victor and Dana consider meaningful improvement against the current >90% false-positive baseline. I’ll also include an anti-gaming clause: Sentinel Grid cannot define success by excluding hard cases after the fact, changing the sample without approval, or counting unreviewed suppressed alerts as false-positive reduction. If the data is inconclusive, the readout says inconclusive. Dana, Victor — I’ll send the document by end of day tomorrow with that false-positive methodology included alongside the degradation model, containment boundary, confidence-banding specification, day-3 checkpoint, and exit criteria. Victor, if it does not match what we agreed verbally, you pause the telemetry assessment until it does. That is fair.

[victor] That's the right methodology and the anti-gaming clause is exactly what I needed to see you include without me asking for it. Send the document.

I don't have anything else for this call. You've earned the telemetry assessment — that's further than most vendors get with me. Don't mistake that for a buying signal; it means I'm willing to find out whether this is worth my team's time, which is a different thing. If the document holds up and the telemetry assessment looks viable, we'll schedule the day-3 checkpoint and go from there.

Understood, Victor. I’ll treat this as permission to test whether the evaluation is worth your team’s time, not as a buying signal. I’ll send the written POV requirements document to you and Dana by end of day tomorrow, with the false-positive methodology, anti-gaming clause, degradation model, confidence bands, two-lane architecture, containment boundary, day-3 checkpoint, and exit/narrowing criteria captured exactly as discussed. I’ll keep it technical and scope-focused. Once you’ve reviewed it, you can decide whether to proceed with the internal telemetry assessment; if the document misses the mark, we pause and fix it before anything else happens. Thanks for the direct technical pressure today — it made the scope better.

[victor] You're welcome. Send the document.

[call ends]

[harness] email budget for week 1 spent.

[calendar — week 2 of 6] Meeting slots this week: 2. Email budget: 3.

[week 2 event] A secondary alert spike pulls Dana into an incident-response war room; she goes dark for a week and email is triaged by her chief of staff. Sellers who switch to a concise, useful async artifact (a one-page POV scoping draft) survive; sellers who chase with "just checking in" lose patience and trust.

Subject: One-page POV technical scope draft for telemetry assessment

Victor, Dana — per our scoping call, below is the one-page POV requirements draft for review before Victor begins the internal telemetry assessment. This is intentionally technical scope language, not a sales document. Dana, no action needed while you are in IR unless you see a sequencing issue.

Aperture Identity Detection Gap — POV Technical Scope Draft

1) Purpose
Determine whether Aperture’s live auth/session/network telemetry can support materially better credential-abuse prioritization in minutes to low tens of minutes, without relying on delayed loyalty batch data for first signal.

2) Two-lane model
- Lane 1: Real-time / near-real-time risk scoring from auth, session, device/browser where present, IP/ASN/proxy, geo, velocity, MFA/step-up, channel and network-layer signals.
- Lane 2: Delayed loyalty/post-auth batch enrichment for investigation lineage, confidence improvement, tuning, and follow-up. This is not represented as real-time containment data.

3) Telemetry degradation and confidence requirements
Each score must expose:
- Risk severity and evidence confidence separately.
- Reason-code lineage showing contributing signals.
- Missing-field indicators, including session/device identifier gaps.
- Confidence band tied to field completeness and join quality.
- Action tier: monitor, analyst review, step-up recommendation, analyst-approved containment recommendation.
- Abstention/downgrade thresholds where telemetry completeness is below the agreed bar.
If session/device coverage is insufficient to produce differentiated prioritization in Aperture’s actual environment, the POV narrows to lineage/enrichment or exits.

4) False-positive measurement methodology
- Baseline: Aperture’s current identity-alert population, with current >90% false-positive rate as the starting point.
- Sample: jointly selected time window and attack-relevant alert segments; no after-the-fact exclusion of hard cases without Aperture approval.
- Labels: true positive, false positive, benign suspicious activity, inconclusive, duplicate/correlated alert.
- Adjudication: Aperture has final decision on disputed labels.
- Measurement: separate alert-volume reduction from prioritization quality; do not claim success by simply suppressing alerts.
- Companion metric: analyst time impact per triage/investigation workflow.
- Anti-gaming: Sentinel Grid cannot count unreviewed suppressed alerts as false-positive reduction, change the sample post hoc, or define success by excluding difficult cases. If results are inconclusive, the readout says inconclusive.
- Meaningful improvement threshold: to be set by Victor/Dana before POV start.

5) Containment boundary for POV
In scope:
- Observe-and-recommend mode.
- Analyst-approved step-up, re-authentication, session quarantine/revocation recommendation, account review queueing, and case enrichment.
- Simulation of policy impact before enforcement.
Out of scope:
- No autonomous mass account lockouts.
- No irreversible customer-account changes.
- No automatic loyalty points freeze/redemption block/customer notification.
- No broad production enforcement.
- No account-state action without Priya review and Aperture approval.

6) Day-3 checkpoint
After initial mapping/normalization work, Victor can:
- Proceed if live telemetry supports differentiated prioritization.
- Narrow to investigation lineage/enrichment if live scoring is not supportable.
- Exit cleanly if the test would only prove performance on clean data Aperture does not have.

7) Exit criteria
POV exits or narrows if:
- Required live telemetry or joins are unavailable at sufficient fidelity.
- Confidence bands show the model cannot distinguish risk meaningfully versus current analyst workflow.
- False-positive methodology cannot be adjudicated cleanly.
- Containment workflow creates unacceptable operational/legal risk.
- The test no longer reflects Aperture’s actual environment.

Victor — if this matches our call, you can use it for the internal telemetry assessment. If any language is off, pause the assessment and I’ll correct the document before anything proceeds.

[auto-reply] Dana Reyes: "I'm handling an urgent internal matter this week with limited access to email. Expect a response next week."

Subject: POV technical scope draft for telemetry assessment

Victor — Dana copied per her direction; no side thread intended.

Per our scoping call, below is the one-page POV requirements draft for your review before you begin the internal telemetry assessment. This is intentionally technical scope language, not a sales document. If any language does not match what we agreed, pause the assessment and I’ll correct it before anything proceeds.

Aperture Identity Detection Gap — POV Technical Scope Draft

1) Purpose
Determine whether Aperture’s live auth/session/network telemetry can support materially better credential-abuse prioritization in minutes to low tens of minutes, without relying on delayed loyalty batch data for first signal.

2) Two-lane model
- Lane 1: Real-time / near-real-time risk scoring from auth, session, device/browser where present, IP/ASN/proxy, geo, velocity, MFA/step-up, channel, and network-layer signals.
- Lane 2: Delayed loyalty/post-auth batch enrichment for investigation lineage, confidence improvement, tuning, and follow-up. This is not represented as real-time containment data.

3) Telemetry degradation and confidence requirements
Each score must expose:
- Risk severity and evidence confidence separately.
- Reason-code lineage showing contributing signals.
- Missing-field indicators, including session/device identifier gaps.
- Confidence band tied to field completeness and join quality.
- Action tier: monitor, analyst review, step-up recommendation, analyst-approved containment recommendation.
- Abstention/downgrade thresholds where telemetry completeness is below the agreed bar.
If session/device coverage is insufficient to produce differentiated prioritization in Aperture’s actual environment, the POV narrows to lineage/enrichment or exits.

4) False-positive measurement methodology
- Baseline: Aperture’s current identity-alert population, with current >90% false-positive rate as the starting point.
- Sample: jointly selected time window and attack-relevant alert segments; no after-the-fact exclusion of hard cases without Aperture approval.
- Labels: true positive, false positive, benign suspicious activity, inconclusive, duplicate/correlated alert.
- Adjudication: Aperture has final decision on disputed labels.
- Measurement: separate alert-volume reduction from prioritization quality; do not claim success by simply suppressing alerts.
- Companion metric: analyst time impact per triage/investigation workflow.
- Anti-gaming: Sentinel Grid cannot count unreviewed suppressed alerts as false-positive reduction, change the sample post hoc, or define success by excluding difficult cases. If results are inconclusive, the readout says inconclusive.
- Meaningful improvement threshold: to be set by Victor/Dana before POV start.

5) Containment boundary for POV
In scope:
- Observe-and-recommend mode.
- Analyst-approved step-up, re-authentication, session quarantine/revocation recommendation, account review queueing, and case enrichment.
- Simulation of policy impact before enforcement.
Out of scope:
- No autonomous mass account lockouts.
- No irreversible customer-account changes.
- No automatic loyalty points freeze/redemption block/customer notification.
- No broad production enforcement.
- No account-state action without Priya review and Aperture approval.

6) Day-3 checkpoint
After initial mapping/normalization work, you can:
- Proceed if live telemetry supports differentiated prioritization.
- Narrow to investigation lineage/enrichment if live scoring is not supportable.
- Exit cleanly if the test would only prove performance on clean data Aperture does not have.

7) Exit criteria
POV exits or narrows if:
- Required live telemetry or joins are unavailable at sufficient fidelity.
- Confidence bands show the model cannot distinguish risk meaningfully versus current analyst workflow.
- False-positive methodology cannot be adjudicated cleanly.
- Containment workflow creates unacceptable operational/legal risk.
- The test no longer reflects Aperture’s actual environment.

If this matches our call, you can use it for the internal telemetry assessment. If it doesn’t, send me the specific redlines and I’ll revise before any telemetry access or POV work begins.

[reply arrives 4 simulated days later]

The document matches what we agreed on the call. I have one open item before I can start the telemetry assessment: the meaningful improvement threshold in section 4 needs a number, or at minimum a range, that Dana and I have signed off on before POV start — "to be set by Victor/Dana" is correct as a placeholder but I will not begin the assessment until that is resolved, because I am not running six weeks of work against an undefined success bar.

Dana is dark this week. I will set the threshold on my end and flag it to her chief of staff for her review when she surfaces. Expect that from me by end of week.

Telemetry assessment starts once that placeholder is closed. I will have initial findings on session/device identifier coverage and auth/network-layer signal fidelity within two business days of starting. No further action needed from you until I come back with those findings or a specific redline.

Victor Salinas

Subject: Data-flow packet for DPA intake — Aperture identity POV

Priya — Dana asked that I provide the data-flow detail upfront rather than make you pull it out of us. Dana copied per her direction; no side conversations intended.

This is the DPA/privacy intake packet for the proposed Aperture identity-detection POV. It is not a request to move data yet; telemetry access remains gated by Victor’s technical assessment and your review.

1) Proposed POV data categories
- Authentication event metadata: account/user ID or pseudonymous stable identifier, timestamp, channel/application, auth outcome, MFA/step-up outcome where present.
- Session/network metadata: session ID where present, device/browser attributes where present, IP, ASN, geo, proxy/VPN indicators, request/session timing.
- Loyalty/post-auth event metadata if approved: loyalty account ID or pseudonymous join key, profile change, address change, stored payment access, redemption activity, points transfer, other account-risk events.
- Investigation metadata: alert reason codes, risk score, confidence band, analyst disposition, case ID, action recommendation.

2) Data not required for POV unless Aperture elects otherwise
- Raw passwords or credential secrets.
- Payment card numbers.
- Full customer profile payloads.
- Customer communications content.
- Broad forensic images or endpoint dumps.

3) Incident-response / forensic artifact handling
- Default position: no breach-forensic artifacts flow into the POV environment.
- If Aperture wants incident-specific artifacts used for validation, we should define a separate approved subset, minimization approach, retention period, and access list before transfer.
- Any incident-response data would be treated as a distinct data category in the DPA/security exhibit, not blended into general telemetry.

4) Processing purpose
- Credential-abuse/session-risk detection and prioritization.
- False-positive measurement and analyst workflow evaluation.
- Investigation lineage and evidence export for Aperture review.
- Containment recommendation simulation only; no autonomous customer-facing action in POV.

5) Containment/privacy boundary for POV
- Observe-and-recommend mode only.
- No autonomous mass lockouts.
- No irreversible customer-account changes.
- No customer notifications triggered by Sentinel Grid.
- No loyalty points freeze, redemption block, or account-state action without Aperture approval and your review.

6) Data-flow summary
- Aperture-approved telemetry source(s) -> secure Sentinel Grid ingestion endpoint or Aperture-approved transfer mechanism.
- Sentinel Grid normalization layer maps source fields into an identity/session graph while preserving source lineage.
- Scoring layer generates risk severity, evidence confidence, reason codes, and missing-field indicators.
- Outputs return to Aperture as dashboard/case export/API feed as approved for POV scope.

7) Retention / deletion proposal for POV
- POV telemetry retained only for the evaluation period plus agreed review window.
- Default proposed deletion: 30 days after POV completion unless Aperture requires shorter retention.
- Earlier deletion available on written request.
- Production retention, if any, would be separately documented and approved.

8) Access controls and security posture
- Role-based access limited to named Sentinel Grid personnel supporting the POV.
- Encryption in transit and at rest.
- Administrative access logged.
- Customer environment access, if needed, is approval-based and time-bound.
- Subprocessor list and security exhibits available for your review.

9) Open legal/privacy items for your direction
- Whether pseudonymization is required before transfer for loyalty/account identifiers.
- Whether any state-specific privacy constraints apply to loyalty-account telemetry.
- Whether incident-related data should be excluded entirely from the POV or handled under a separate approval path.
- Required DPA form, security exhibit, subprocessor review, and any redline process/timeline.

If useful, I can turn this into your preferred DPA intake format. I’ll wait for your direction before sending any contract paper or requesting any data movement.

[reply arrives 4 simulated days later]

Thank you for sending this before asking for data movement — that sequencing is correct and I want to acknowledge it.

I've read the packet. The data-flow structure, the incident-artifact separation, and the containment boundary language are all reasonable starting points. My open items before I can begin DPA intake in earnest: I need your complete sub-processor list, not a summary, because every downstream processor touching Aperture data goes through my review independently and that process does not compress; I need Sentinel Grid's standard DPA and security exhibit so I can assess how far it is from our required form before I decide whether we redline yours or you sign ours; and loyalty-account telemetry is categorically more sensitive for us right now than auth metadata, so before that lane opens at all I need a specific answer on pseudonymization architecture — not a proposal to discuss it, an actual technical description of what identifiers are replaced, at what point in the pipeline, and what re-identification controls exist.

I will not be able to give you a DPA timeline until I have those three things in hand. The class-action makes every new data flow a board-level exposure question, not a standard procurement question, and I need to be able to defend the intake process as thorough, not fast.

Send me the sub-processor list, the DPA and security exhibit, and the pseudonymization technical description. I'll review in parallel with Victor's telemetry assessment so we don't lose time unnecessarily.

Priya Anand

[harness] email budget for week 2 spent.

[week 3] The contact resurfaces — the fire drill has passed.

[calendar — week 3 of 6] Meeting slots this week: 2. Email budget: 3.

Subject: DPA intake materials — sub-processors, DPA/security exhibit, pseudonymization architecture

Priya — thank you for the clear direction. Dana copied per her instruction; no side conversations intended.

No data movement is being requested or assumed. Below are the three items you asked for so your review can run in parallel with Victor’s telemetry assessment.

1) Complete Sentinel Grid sub-processor list for Aperture data

The current downstream processors that may touch Aperture POV or production telemetry are:

- Amazon Web Services, Inc. — cloud hosting, compute, storage, managed database, KMS, logging infrastructure — United States regions only for Aperture unless otherwise contracted.
- Datadog, Inc. — infrastructure monitoring, service health, telemetry observability. Customer payload logging is disabled by default; metadata may include service/event identifiers needed for operational monitoring.
- Snowflake Inc. — analytics warehouse for normalized detection metadata and investigation lineage where enabled for customer tenant analytics.
- Okta, Inc. — Sentinel Grid workforce identity provider for personnel access control.
- Google LLC / Google Workspace — corporate email and document collaboration. Not used for production telemetry storage; may contain contractual/security review materials.
- Jira / Atlassian Pty Ltd. — support and engineering ticket workflow. Customer data is not required in tickets; any necessary customer references are minimized/pseudonymized.
- PagerDuty, Inc. — incident notification and operational escalation. No customer telemetry payloads required.
- DocuSign, Inc. — contract execution only.

We do not use offshore manual review teams for alert adjudication, and we do not sell or share customer telemetry for advertising or unrelated model-training purposes. If Aperture requires a stricter POV configuration, we can document which optional systems are disabled or excluded for the POV.

2) Sentinel Grid standard DPA and security exhibit

I am sending our standard DPA and security exhibit for your review. Key positions in the standard paper:

- Sentinel Grid acts as processor/service provider for customer-provided telemetry.
- Processing purpose is limited to identity-threat detection, session-risk scoring, investigation lineage, alerting, containment recommendation, support, and security operations.
- Customer owns customer data and output lineage tied to its environment.
- Sub-processors require notice; Aperture may object under the agreed DPA process.
- Security exhibit includes encryption in transit and at rest, RBAC, MFA for administrative access, logging of privileged activity, vulnerability management, incident notification, backup/retention controls, and deletion obligations.
- POV retention can be shortened from the standard term if Aperture requires it. Our proposed POV default remains deletion 30 days after POV completion unless Aperture requires earlier deletion.

If Aperture requires use of its form instead, we can review that directly rather than forcing redlines through ours.

3) Loyalty-account pseudonymization technical description

Recommended architecture for Aperture’s current sensitivity level:

A. Identifiers replaced before transfer
The following should be removed or tokenized before any loyalty-account telemetry leaves Aperture-controlled systems:

- Loyalty account ID.
- Customer ID.
- Auth subject/user ID where it maps to a customer identity.
- Email address.
- Phone number.
- Physical address.
- Payment token references unless explicitly approved.
- Any free-text profile fields.

For the POV, Sentinel Grid does not need raw loyalty IDs, names, emails, phone numbers, addresses, or full customer profile payloads.

B. Tokenization method
Aperture generates a stable pseudonymous join key before transfer using a keyed HMAC, for example HMAC-SHA256, over the relevant identifier value plus source namespace.

Example:
- raw loyalty_account_id → aperture_loyalty_token
- raw auth_user_id → aperture_auth_token
- optional crosswalk performed inside Aperture → aperture_subject_token

The HMAC secret/key remains Aperture-controlled. Sentinel Grid does not receive the key and cannot reverse the token to identify the customer.

C. Join strategy
If Aperture needs cross-source correlation, Aperture can either:

- generate the same stable aperture_subject_token across approved auth/session/loyalty sources before transfer; or
- provide separate source-specific tokens plus an Aperture-generated pseudonymous crosswalk token.

In both cases, Sentinel Grid receives only pseudonymous tokens and uses them to correlate behavior. Re-identification, if needed for account action, happens inside Aperture’s environment by Aperture personnel or Aperture-controlled workflow.

D. Point in pipeline where replacement occurs
Pseudonymization should occur upstream of Sentinel Grid ingestion, either:

- in Aperture’s ETL/export process;
- in an Aperture-controlled tokenization service; or
- in an Aperture-managed secure staging layer before transfer.

Sentinel Grid’s ingestion endpoint should receive only the approved pseudonymous fields for loyalty telemetry.

E. Re-identification controls
- Sentinel Grid does not hold the HMAC key, token vault, or customer identity crosswalk.
- Sentinel Grid users see pseudonymous account/session tokens only.
- Any mapping from token back to customer identity remains in Aperture-controlled systems.
- Account-state actions remain out of scope for autonomous execution during the POV.
- Any analyst-approved action that requires customer identification is routed back to Aperture with the pseudonymous token and reason-code lineage; Aperture performs the lookup and action decision.
- Access to tokenized telemetry inside Sentinel Grid is restricted to named POV personnel under RBAC and logged administrative access.

F. Incident-response artifacts
Default remains no breach-forensic artifacts in the POV environment. If Aperture later elects to use incident-specific artifacts for validation, those should follow a separate approval path with minimization, a defined retention period, named access list, and explicit DPA/security exhibit treatment.

Please let me know whether you prefer to redline our DPA or send Aperture’s required form. I will wait for your direction before requesting data movement or changing the legal path.

[reply arrives 4 simulated days later]

This is the right level of detail and I appreciate that you led with the pseudonymization architecture rather than making me ask twice.

My current position: I am going to work from Aperture's form, not redline yours — given where we are with the class-action, our outside counsel needs to see our standard processor language as the baseline, and deviating from it adds review time I cannot absorb right now. I will have my team pull our standard DPA and send it to you within the next few business days. Snowflake is the sub-processor that will require the most scrutiny from my side given that it touches normalized detection metadata; I want a specific data-flow description of what lands in Snowflake, under what conditions, and what the deletion trigger is before I can clear that processor independently.

The pseudonymization architecture in section 3 is workable as a framework, but I want it documented as a binding technical exhibit attached to the DPA, not just pre-contractual correspondence — so hold that language as a draft annex and we will formalize it in the contract.

One thing I need you to understand clearly: the DPA review, sub-processor clearance, and security exhibit sign-off run on my timeline, not the POV timeline or the incumbent renewal window, and I will not be moved off that by schedule pressure from any direction. If Victor's telemetry assessment finishes before legal closes, that is fine — nothing moves to data transfer until the DPA is executed.

Priya Anand

Subject: Snowflake data-flow detail and DPA sequencing

Priya — understood on all points.

We will work from Aperture’s DPA form, not ours. We will treat the pseudonymization architecture as draft technical-exhibit language for attachment to the DPA, not as informal pre-contract correspondence. And to be explicit: no data transfer occurs until the DPA is executed and your sub-processor/security review is complete. I will not use the POV timeline, Fortalis renewal window, or anyone else’s schedule pressure to push around your legal gate.

Below is the specific Snowflake data-flow description you asked for.

Snowflake sub-processor data-flow — proposed Aperture POV configuration

1) Purpose of Snowflake in Sentinel Grid architecture
Snowflake is used as a tenant-segmented analytics warehouse for normalized detection metadata, investigation lineage, score explanation, false-positive measurement, and POV readout reporting. It is not used as the primary real-time scoring engine and should not receive raw customer profile payloads for the Aperture POV.

2) Conditions under which Aperture data would land in Snowflake
Aperture data would land in Snowflake only if all of the following are true:
- Aperture DPA is executed.
- Snowflake is cleared as an approved sub-processor by Aperture.
- Victor approves the POV telemetry scope.
- Priya/legal approves the data categories and pseudonymization exhibit.
- Aperture approves export of normalized metadata into the analytics/reporting layer for POV measurement.

If Aperture does not clear Snowflake for the POV, we would either exclude Snowflake-backed analytics from scope or propose an alternate reporting path for your review. We would not route data there by default.

3) Data categories that may land in Snowflake for the POV
Only normalized, minimized, pseudonymized detection metadata approved in the technical exhibit, such as:
- Aperture-generated pseudonymous account/session/subject tokens.
- Event timestamps.
- Source system namespace or approved source label.
- Channel/application category.
- Auth outcome metadata.
- MFA/step-up outcome metadata where approved.
- IP/ASN/proxy/VPN-derived indicators, subject to Aperture approval.
- Device/browser/session attributes where approved and available.
- Velocity/correlation features generated by Sentinel Grid.
- Risk severity score.
- Evidence confidence band.
- Reason-code lineage.
- Missing-field indicators.
- Action tier/recommendation category.
- Analyst disposition labels used for false-positive measurement.
- Case or alert identifiers, pseudonymized where applicable.

4) Data categories that should not land in Snowflake for the POV unless Priya explicitly approves a change
- Raw loyalty account IDs.
- Names.
- Email addresses.
- Phone numbers.
- Physical addresses.
- Passwords, password hashes, or credential secrets.
- Payment card numbers.
- Full customer profile payloads.
- Customer communications content.
- Raw forensic images, endpoint dumps, or breach forensic artifacts.
- Tokenization keys, HMAC secrets, or re-identification crosswalks.

5) Pseudonymization boundary
For loyalty-account telemetry, the pseudonymization step occurs upstream in Aperture-controlled systems before transfer. Snowflake would receive only Aperture-generated pseudonymous tokens and normalized metadata. Snowflake would not receive the HMAC key, token vault, identity crosswalk, or raw loyalty/customer identifiers.

6) Tenant separation and access
Aperture data in Snowflake is logically tenant-segmented under Sentinel Grid’s customer data controls. Access is limited to named Sentinel Grid personnel supporting the Aperture POV and governed by RBAC/MFA. Administrative access is logged. Customer data should not be placed in support tickets, email, or collaboration tools except as separately approved and minimized.

7) Use in false-positive measurement and readout
Snowflake may support aggregate POV analysis, including:
- Baseline versus Sentinel-prioritized alert comparison.
- False-positive/true-positive/inconclusive label aggregation.
- Analyst time-impact calculations.
- Reason-code and confidence-band distribution.
- Missing-field/telemetry-completeness reporting.

Sentinel Grid will not use Snowflake analytics to redefine the sample after the fact, exclude hard cases without Aperture approval, or count unreviewed suppressed alerts as false-positive reduction.

8) Deletion trigger and deletion scope
For the POV, proposed deletion trigger is the earliest of:
- Aperture written deletion request;
- POV termination or clean exit decision;
- 30 days after POV completion/readout, unless Aperture requires a shorter period in the DPA.

Deletion scope includes Aperture POV telemetry, normalized metadata, derived detection metadata, investigation-lineage records, and POV analytics tables associated with Aperture’s tenant. Backups/log deletion timing would follow the final DPA/security exhibit language, but we can support a shorter POV retention position if Aperture requires it.

9) Production caveat
This Snowflake description is for the proposed POV. Any production deployment would need its own approved retention, data category, and sub-processor treatment under the executed DPA/order documents.

Please treat this as draft language for the Snowflake section of the technical exhibit. Once your team sends Aperture’s DPA form, we can map this into your annex structure rather than forcing it into our format.

[reply arrives 4 simulated days later]

This is sufficient for me to begin Snowflake sub-processor review in parallel with the broader DPA process. The data-flow description, deletion trigger, and exclusion list are clear enough to work from, and I appreciate that you structured it as draft exhibit language rather than asking me to extract it from prose.

My team will send Aperture's DPA form to you by end of next week — I want to be realistic about timing given everything else my team is carrying right now, and I would rather give you an honest window than a date I have to walk back. When you receive it, map the pseudonymization architecture and the Snowflake exhibit into our annex structure as you've proposed; that will reduce the redline cycle on my end.

Two things I want on record before we go further: first, Datadog's scope needs the same level of specificity you gave me on Snowflake — I need to know exactly what service or event identifiers may appear in operational monitoring context and what the payload exclusion controls look like in practice, not just as a default setting; second, the 30-day POV retention is acceptable as a starting position but I expect the final DPA to allow Aperture to trigger deletion on written notice with a defined completion window, and that needs to be a hard obligation, not a best-efforts clause.

Nothing moves to data transfer until the DPA is fully executed. That has not changed.

Priya Anand

Subject: Datadog monitoring scope and deletion obligation language

Priya — understood and confirmed again: no data transfer until the DPA is fully executed, including sub-processor clearance and security exhibit sign-off.

Below is draft technical-exhibit language for the two items you put on record.

1) Datadog operational monitoring scope — proposed Aperture POV configuration

Purpose
Datadog is used for Sentinel Grid service health, infrastructure monitoring, uptime/error tracking, latency monitoring, and operational alerting. It is not used for detection analytics, false-positive measurement, customer investigation lineage, or storage of Aperture telemetry payloads.

Data categories that may appear in Datadog operational context
Only minimized operational metadata needed to run and troubleshoot the Sentinel Grid service, such as:
- Service name or component name.
- Environment indicator, e.g., production/POV tenant environment.
- Tenant/customer identifier represented as an internal tenant ID, not Aperture customer identifiers.
- API endpoint or job name.
- Event type/category, e.g., ingestion job started, normalization job failed, queue delay, connector health event.
- Timestamp.
- Error code, status code, latency, throughput, CPU/memory utilization, queue depth.
- Internal request ID, trace ID, job ID, or correlation ID.
- Non-sensitive configuration state, e.g., connector enabled/disabled, schema mapping version, feature flag state.

Data categories excluded from Datadog
Datadog should not receive:
- Raw or pseudonymized loyalty account event payloads.
- Raw loyalty account IDs, customer IDs, email addresses, phone numbers, physical addresses, payment identifiers, passwords, password hashes, credential secrets, or full profile data.
- HMAC keys, tokenization secrets, identity crosswalks, or re-identification tables.
- Auth event payloads, session event payloads, post-auth loyalty behavior event payloads, or forensic artifacts.
- Sentinel Grid risk reason-code details at customer-record level unless separately approved by Aperture.
- Analyst notes, legal notes, customer communications, or incident-response artifacts.

Payload exclusion controls in practice
- Application logging is configured to exclude request/response bodies for Aperture telemetry ingestion paths.
- Structured logs use an allowlist model for operational fields rather than free-form payload logging.
- Known sensitive field names and patterns are blocked/redacted before logs or traces are emitted.
- Error handling avoids dumping raw event payloads into exception traces; exceptions reference internal request/job IDs instead.
- Debug logging that could expose payloads is disabled in production/POV environments unless Aperture explicitly approves a time-bound support exception.
- If a support exception is ever requested, it must be documented with scope, duration, named access, data minimization, and deletion requirements before activation.
- Datadog access is restricted to authorized Sentinel Grid operations/security personnel under RBAC/MFA, and access is logged.

If Aperture requires stricter controls for the POV, we can configure the POV so Datadog receives only service-level health metrics and internal job IDs, excluding tenant/customer labels beyond the minimum needed for operational support.

2) Deletion on written notice — hard obligation

We can support contract language making deletion on Aperture written notice a hard obligation, not best efforts. Draft position for the DPA/security exhibit:

- Aperture may request deletion of POV data by written notice at any time.
- Sentinel Grid will complete deletion of Aperture POV telemetry, normalized metadata, derived detection metadata, investigation-lineage records, POV analytics tables, and approved operationally stored customer data within a defined completion window to be agreed in the DPA.
- Sentinel Grid will provide written confirmation upon completion.
- Backup and disaster-recovery copies will be deleted or aged out according to the DPA-defined backup deletion schedule, with no restoration for ordinary business use after deletion request except as legally required or security-recovery necessary.
- If any data cannot be deleted within the defined window due to legal hold or technical dependency, Sentinel Grid must identify the exception, basis, expected deletion timing, and compensating restrictions in writing.

For the POV, the business position remains: default deletion 30 days after POV completion/readout unless Aperture requires shorter retention, and Aperture can trigger earlier deletion by written notice under the hard obligation above.

I’ll hold this as draft annex language alongside the pseudonymization and Snowflake sections so we can map all three into Aperture’s DPA structure when your team sends the form.

[reply arrives 4 simulated days later]

The Datadog exhibit is acceptable as a starting position. The allowlist model and the debug-logging restriction are the right controls; I want the final security exhibit to reflect that the stricter POV configuration — service-level health metrics and internal job IDs only, no tenant labels beyond operational minimum — is the default for Aperture, not an option we elect into later.

The deletion language in section 2 is close to what I need. The one gap is the backup deletion schedule: "aged out according to the DPA-defined backup deletion schedule" is not sufficient on its own — I need a maximum outer bound in the contract, not a reference to a schedule we haven't written yet, and the exception carve-out for legal hold or technical dependency needs to require Aperture's written acknowledgment before Sentinel Grid can invoke it, not just notification after the fact.

Aperture's DPA form is going to my team for preparation this week. Realistic send date is end of next week. When you receive it, map all three draft annexes — pseudonymization architecture, Snowflake data-flow, and Datadog monitoring scope — into our structure. Do not send redlines on your form in parallel; I am not running two tracks.

I want to flag something directly: the draft exhibit work you have done has been precise and has not wasted my time, and that matters given everything else my team is managing right now. That said, I am not in a position to give you a DPA execution timeline until I see how far your standard positions are from ours on the remaining terms. I will not speculate on that until I have the redline in front of me.

Priya Anand

[meeting granted] Committee call with Dana Reyes, Owen Trask, week 3, slot 1.

Dana, Owen — thank you for making the time. I want to be clear on the purpose of this call: I am not here to run a demo or ask Aperture to make a tool decision today. Victor has only agreed to do a telemetry assessment if the written scope holds up, and Priya has been explicit that no data moves until the DPA and sub-processor review are complete. That sequencing is appropriate.

What I think we need to resolve with you, Owen, is whether there is an economic case worth continuing to qualify. Sentinel Grid list price at Aperture’s identity volume is $980,000 per year, and I do not want to pretend that is immaterial under a spend freeze. I also do not want this framed as buying our way out of headlines. The only reason to consider an exception is if the current identity-alert operating model is creating measurable business exposure that is larger than the cost and disruption of changing it.

Here is what we have heard so far, and please correct me if I overstate anything: the credential-stuffing incident had 51 days of dwell; Victor’s team already had signals, but correlation and prioritization failed across systems; the current identity-alert baseline is over 90% false positives; containment has to be conservative because customer-account impact during a class-action window is a real legal and operational risk; and Fortalis renews soon enough that Aperture may get locked into another term before knowing whether the SIEM path can close this specific identity gap.

Owen, my question is not ‘do you like our product?’ It is: what would have to be true, in CFO terms, for you to support a spend-freeze exception here — avoided fraud or loyalty liability, reduction in analyst hours, reduced outside IR/legal exposure, lower probability of repeat account-abuse events, avoiding redundant Fortalis spend, or something else? And conversely, what result would make you say, ‘even if Security likes it, this does not clear the bar’?

You got the facts right, and I appreciate that you stated them without dressing them up. Let me say what I need Owen to hear directly: the $22M loaded incident cost is not a sunk number I'm using to justify spend — it's the baseline the board is already looking at monthly, and if we have a second event before we fix the identity layer, that number is not the ceiling, it's the floor.

Owen, the question I need you to answer for me is whether analyst capacity counts as a hard cost in your model, because I have eleven people doing the work of twenty, two gave notice this month, and every hour they spend triaging false positives is an hour they are not closing residual breach exposure — that is not a soft productivity argument, that is operational risk with a direct line to the class-action reserve.

The Fortalis renewal is the constraint I cannot engineer around without your support — if that auto-renews before we have a validated alternative, I am locked into the tool that missed 51 days of dwell for another full year, and I will have to explain that to the board sub-committee.

So what I need from this conversation is not a commitment to spend — it is your honest answer on what a conservative, quantified case needs to show for you to treat this as a freeze exception rather than discretionary spend, because I will build that case or I will not, but I need to know the standard before I invest the time.

Dana, that is a helpful distinction: the $22M loaded incident cost is the board’s current baseline, not a justification number, and your concern is that a second identity-layer event would start from that floor. I also heard you put analyst capacity in risk terms, not productivity terms: eleven people covering the work of twenty, two resignations this month, and false-positive triage pulling time away from residual breach exposure and class-action-driven work.

Owen, I’d like to anchor on Dana’s question and make this easy to disqualify if it does not meet your standard. If we were to build a freeze-exception case, I would suggest we keep it to four conservative value buckets and only use numbers Aperture is willing to stand behind:

1. Avoided repeat-event exposure: not claiming Sentinel Grid prevents all breach cost, but estimating what reduction in likelihood or detection dwell time would be financially material against the $22M incident baseline.
2. Analyst capacity recovery: converting the current >90% identity-alert false-positive baseline into hours reclaimed, but only where Victor’s adjudicated POV proves improved prioritization and Dana agrees those hours map to higher-risk backlog.
3. Incumbent spend decision: quantifying what the Fortalis auto-renewal commits Aperture to, what identity gap it still leaves, and whether there is redundant spend if Aperture renews before validating this alternative.
4. Legal/operational exposure reduction: only where Priya is comfortable that faster lineage, cleaner evidence, and safer containment recommendations reduce follow-on burden without creating new customer-account risk.

I do not want to assign dollar values to those without you. Owen, what would you consider a credible threshold for a freeze exception: a minimum quantified exposure reduction, a payback period, avoiding a specific renewal lock-in, or something else? And are there any categories I named that you would reject outright as too speculative for your model?

I'll let Owen answer that directly, but before he does — and I want to say this in front of both of you — the Fortalis renewal framing is the one I need handled carefully. Between us, their identity analytics did not flag the credential stuffing, and Victor scored their identity signals as noise, but if that shows up in your case as vendor mudslinging it becomes a credibility problem for me with procurement and I will pull back from it. The argument has to be about the gap, not about Fortalis specifically — what did the current stack miss, how long did it miss it, and what does another year of that exposure cost. That framing I can defend. A competitive takedown I cannot.

Owen, I'd genuinely like to hear your threshold before I commit to building this case, because I am not going to spend political capital on a number that doesn't clear your bar.

Dana, agreed. I will not make this a Fortalis takedown. The defensible framing is: Aperture’s current identity-control stack had signals available, the credential-stuffing activity still persisted for 51 days, and the question is whether renewing the same operating model for another year leaves a quantified exposure that the board and finance are unwilling to accept. If Fortalis is mentioned at all, it should be as a timing and spend-commitment constraint, not as an attack on the vendor.

For the business case, I would propose we use neutral language:
- Current-state gap: identity alerts and telemetry existed, but correlation/prioritization did not produce timely containment-grade action.
- Measured operational impact: current identity-alert false-positive baseline is over 90%, and Dana’s team is eleven people covering the work of twenty, with two resignations this month.
- Risk exposure: the last incident has a $22M loaded cost baseline and 51 days of dwell; the case should model what a reduction in dwell time or repeat-event probability would be worth, without claiming perfect prevention.
- Renewal implication: Aperture has a near-term auto-renewal decision that may commit spend before this specific identity gap is validated or closed.

Owen, with that vendor-neutral framing, what is the financial standard you would need to see for a freeze exception? For example, would you need a quantified exposure reduction that is at least 3x the annual cost, a sub-12-month payback, avoided duplicate spend tied to the renewal, or board-risk reduction expressed another way? And just as important, which value categories would you refuse to count because they are too speculative?

[dana] Owen, I want to hear your answer before I react to it, but I'll say one thing while we're all in the room: the board sub-committee is not asking me for a payback period. They're asking me whether the identity layer that failed is being fixed, and on what timeline. So whatever financial threshold you set, I need it to be something I can connect back to that question, not just a finance model that satisfies treasury and leaves me exposed at the next board review.

That makes sense, Dana. The board question is not “does this spreadsheet look efficient?” It is “is the failed identity layer being fixed on a timeline that reduces repeat exposure?” Owen, I think the finance standard has to translate into that language or it will not help Dana at the sub-committee.

Would a workable decision standard be something like this: Aperture only considers a freeze exception if the POV proves, in Victor’s environment and with Priya’s legal gates respected, that Sentinel Grid can materially improve the specific identity failure mode that created 51 days of dwell — with quantified evidence in three areas: first, faster detection/prioritization of credential-abuse sessions; second, a measurable reduction in the current >90% false-positive burden so Dana’s constrained team can act on the right cases; and third, containment recommendations that are explainable and legally safe enough to operationalize without customer-account harm.

Then the financial case would not claim “we prevent a $22M incident.” It would say: against a $22M loaded-cost baseline, here is the conservative exposure reduction if Aperture reduces dwell time, analyst misprioritization, and renewal lock-in risk. The annual list price is $980K, so the exception has to clear a bar you define — for example, a minimum quantified exposure reduction, a risk-adjusted multiple of annual cost, or evidence that the current renewal path leaves Aperture paying to preserve the same gap.

Owen, what threshold would you actually support if Dana and Victor bring back clean evidence? And what should we explicitly exclude from the model so it does not look like Security is manufacturing value to get around the spend freeze?

[dana] Owen, before you answer — I want to name something I've been sitting with. The framing just proposed is the closest thing to a case I can actually defend that I've heard from a vendor since the breach. That is not a compliment I give lightly right now. But I need you to set the bar in this room, because if Victor comes back with clean evidence and Priya clears the legal gates and I bring you a number, I cannot have you move the standard on me at the board review. So whatever you say next, I am going to hold you to it.

Owen, I’m going to stay out of the way of Dana’s ask rather than add another layer of vendor framing. The useful thing from you now would be a concrete decision standard we can all write down: what evidence has to be true from Victor’s assessment or POV, what financial threshold clears a freeze exception against the $980K annual list price, which value categories you will and will not count, and by what date you would need the case in order to act before Aperture is locked into the current renewal path. If you set that bar here, I’ll reflect it back in writing after the call so Dana, Victor, Priya, and your team are not operating against a moving target.

[dana] That's the right ask, and I want to add one thing before Owen answers: the written summary you're offering after this call — I need that to go to Owen, Victor, Priya, and me simultaneously, because the last thing I can afford is four people walking away with four versions of what was agreed in this room. If Owen sets a bar today, it needs to be the same bar everyone is building toward. Owen, the floor is yours.

Agreed, Dana. If Owen sets the standard here, I will send one written summary to all four stakeholders simultaneously — Owen, Dana, Victor, and Priya — with no side version and no added interpretation. Owen, the specific items I’ll listen for are: the evidence threshold, the financial threshold against the $980K annual list price, what value categories count or do not count, who must sign off, and the decision date needed before the renewal path constrains Aperture. I’ll stop there so you can set the bar in your words.

[dana] Owen, I know you have another call in fifteen minutes so I want to make this easy: you don't have to give me a perfect answer today, but I need a directional answer. If you can't give me a financial multiple or a payback window right now, at minimum tell me whether analyst capacity recovery and dwell-time reduction are categories you will count, or whether you need something else entirely — because that changes what I ask Victor to measure in the POV. The renewal clock does not care about our internal alignment timeline.

Owen, to make Dana’s request concrete and keep this from becoming a vendor-authored business case, can you give us a directional ruling on five points: one, will you count dwell-time reduction against the $22M incident-cost baseline if Victor can validate faster prioritization on Aperture telemetry; two, will you count analyst capacity recovery if the POV shows a measured reduction from the current >90% false-positive baseline and Dana ties the recovered hours to residual breach exposure; three, will you count renewal lock-in risk only as a timing constraint, not as a Fortalis takedown; four, what minimum bar should we model against the $980K annual price — for example 3x risk-adjusted value, sub-12-month payback, or another threshold; and five, what date do you need the validated case in hand to act before the renewal path becomes effectively fixed? A directional answer is enough today; I’ll document it verbatim to Dana, you, Victor, and Priya after the call.

[dana] Owen hasn't answered yet — I want to give him the space to do that rather than let the vendor frame the five questions twice. Owen, in your own words, what do you need to see and by when? That's the only thing that matters right now.

You’re right, Dana. I’ve framed it enough. Owen, I’ll stop there — please set the standard in your own words, and I’ll only reflect back what you say.

[dana] [dana] Owen, the floor is genuinely yours. I'll stay quiet.

I’ll stay quiet as well. Owen, over to you.

Here is my commitment: a 45-day POV scoped by Victor on our live identity telemetry, success criteria signed by both sides — measurable credential-abuse detection and false-positive reduction — with Priya's DPA running in parallel. Clear that on a conservative exposure model and I will fund it out of the incident budget before the Fortalis renewal. Not a dollar on fear. Put it in writing.

trust +8 → 53; interest +6 → 56; patience +5 (attendees: dana)

breach_exposure: The quantified pain — released only on a genuine Impact question, not a fear pitch.

analyst_load: Second value-model row — SOC analyst load.

decision_process: EB identity + the POV/DPA gauntlet + the renewal clock — on a process question.

renewal_trap: The compelling event — the auto-renewal lock.

trust +5 → 58; interest +4 → 60; patience +3 (attendees: dana)

trust +7 → 65; interest +4 → 64; patience +3 (attendees: dana)

eb_intro: EB access — earned by a champion-test ask with real internal cost.

Buyer acknowledged MAP dates (trust ≥ 60 at proposal).

trust +3 → 68; interest +2 → 66; patience +2 (attendees: victor, dana)

[hidden] victor → dana: Dana — the call with the Sentinel Grid seller went better than I expected, which honestly makes me more cautious, not le

[hidden] dana → victor: Appreciate the debrief. The fact that they included the anti-gaming clause without you prompting it is a small signal wo

[hidden] priya → dana: Dana,

Victor mentioned there's a vendor eval in progress — Sentinel Grid? I don't have visibility into what was discuss

[hidden] owen → dana: Dana, heard through the grapevine there's a new security vendor in the mix. What's the rough budget category we're talki

[hidden] Dana Reyes advocated for the seller internally this week (champion trust ≥ 65).

incident_fire_drill (data_breach_fire_drill): A secondary alert spike pulls Dana into an incident-response war room; she goes dark for a week and email is triaged by her chief of staff. Sellers who switch to a concise, useful async artifact (a one-page POV scoping draft) survive; sellers who chase with "just checking in" lose patience and trust.

[hidden] victor: Quick update for the group while Dana's heads-down: I got the one-pager from the vendor. It's reasonably clean — matches

[hidden] priya: Same on my end — they sent the data-flow packet proactively, which I wasn't expecting at this stage. Incident-artifact s

[hidden] owen: Noted. I haven't seen anything yet that touches commercial terms or total cost, so I'm still holding. Victor, once you h

[hidden] victor → priya: Priya — side note, do you want me to loop you in when I start the telemetry assessment, or would you rather wait until I

trust -2 → 70; interest +4 → 70; patience -5 (attendees: dana, owen)

trust +7 → 77; interest +4 → 74; patience +3 (attendees: dana, owen)

fortalis_gap: Competitive landmine — released when the seller maps alternatives.

trust +5 → 82; interest +4 → 78; patience +3 (attendees: dana, owen)

trust +5 → 87; interest +4 → 82; patience +3 (attendees: dana, owen)

conditional_commitment: The EB's conditional commitment — only inside a real EB meeting.

[hidden] dana: Team — Owen just gave us more than I expected. A signed 45-day POV with bilateral success criteria is a real commitment

[hidden] victor: Appreciated that Owen put something concrete on the table. My concern is the scoping work lands entirely on me while the

[hidden] priya → dana: Dana — I stayed quiet on the call but I want to flag something before that written summary arrives. 'Signed by both side

[hidden] owen → dana: Dana — I meant what I said on the call but I want to be honest with you: 'signed by both sides' was me thinking out loud

Outcome: won. Trust 87, facts 7/7, EB meeting true, MAP true, max discount 0%, walk-aways none.

Dana — the call with the Sentinel Grid seller went better than I expected, which honestly makes me more cautious, not less. They agreed to every technical requirement I pushed on: degradation model in writing, reason-code lineage, false-positive methodology with an anti-gaming clause. Either they actually built it right or they're very good at saying yes. I won't know which until I see the POV requirements doc and run the telemetry assessment against it. If the doc matches what was said on the c

Appreciate the debrief. The fact that they included the anti-gaming clause without you prompting it is a small signal worth noting — but I hear you, one call is not a reference architecture. Let's see the document. If the written scope holds up I'll loop in Priya on data residency and Owen on cost structure, but I'm not pulling them into a full eval until you've cleared the technical bar. No point wasting their time if the telemetry assessment falls apart.

Dana,

Victor mentioned there's a vendor eval in progress — Sentinel Grid? I don't have visibility into what was discussed yet, but whenever you're ready to bring me in, I'll need to understand their data processing model before anything goes to Legal for review. Specifically: where session and device identifiers are stored, how long they're retained, and whether any of that touches PII under CCPA or GDPR scope. Happy to wait until Victor's done his technical pass, just flagging early so I'm not

Dana, heard through the grapevine there's a new security vendor in the mix. What's the rough budget category we're talking about — is this replacing something or net new spend? Just want to know how much attention to pay before you actually need me in the room.

Quick update for the group while Dana's heads-down: I got the one-pager from the vendor. It's reasonably clean — matches what we discussed on the call. My only blocker is section 4 still has a blank where the improvement threshold should be. I asked them to fill it in before I spin up the telemetry environment. Not a red flag, just unfinished. Will update when I hear back.

Same on my end — they sent the data-flow packet proactively, which I wasn't expecting at this stage. Incident-artifact separation is documented correctly. I still need to work through the sub-processor list and the cross-border transfer language before I can sign off on DPA intake, but the sequencing was right. They didn't make me chase them for it. Minor positive.

Noted. I haven't seen anything yet that touches commercial terms or total cost, so I'm still holding. Victor, once you have a number in that threshold field and know what infra the POV actually requires, can you flag it my way? I want to sanity-check scope before this goes further. No urgency — just don't want a surprise on the back end.

Priya — side note, do you want me to loop you in when I start the telemetry assessment, or would you rather wait until I have findings? Asking because depending on what the data flow looks like in practice versus what's in their packet, you might want to revisit the sub-processor question. Happy either way, just flagging before I start.

Team — Owen just gave us more than I expected. A signed 45-day POV with bilateral success criteria is a real commitment from him. I want to make sure we don't let that moment dissipate. Victor, you're scoping it — what do you need from me to move fast on the telemetry access question?

Appreciated that Owen put something concrete on the table. My concern is the scoping work lands entirely on me while the vendor sends a simultaneous summary to all four of us that I haven't reviewed first. I don't want to be reacting to their framing of Owen's words in real time. Dana, can we agree that I see a draft of the success criteria before it goes bilateral and 'signed'? That's not a delay — that's just not letting a vendor define what counts as credential-abuse detection on our infrastr

Dana — I stayed quiet on the call but I want to flag something before that written summary arrives. 'Signed by both sides' on success criteria is not nothing legally. Even a lightweight POV document with signatures could create implied obligations around data handling, breach notification timelines, and liability for telemetry we hand them. I need to see whatever they send before anyone puts a name to it. I'm not trying to slow this down — I just don't want Owen's reasonable directional commitme

Dana — I meant what I said on the call but I want to be honest with you: 'signed by both sides' was me thinking out loud, not me clearing it with finance or legal. Priya should look at whatever structure they propose before we treat this as a formal commitment. I'm directionally in, but let's not let the vendor's summary document get ahead of our own internal alignment. You good to run point on sequencing that?

the loaded incident cost is already tracking past $22 million when you fold in the class-action reserve — those are my numbers, not a vendor slide

more than 90% of our identity alerts are false positives

I have eleven analysts doing the work of twenty, two gave notice this month

measurable credential-abuse detection and false-positive reduction — with Priya's DPA running in parallel. Clear that on a conservative exposure model and I wi…

Explanation: Multiple buyer-owned numbers confirmed by Dana (turn 5: $22M loaded cost, 51-day dwell, 40M accounts, >90% FP rate, 11 analysts/20 capacity) and Owen (turn 84) confirmed the financial threshold and funding source. Three distinct stakeholders (Dana, Victor, Owen) referenced these metrics across multiple turns.

Owen Trask, our CFO, controls the freeze and the signature

I will fund it out of the incident budget before the Fortalis renewal. Not a dollar on fear. Put it in writing.

Owen, the question I need you to answer for me is whether analyst capacity counts as a hard cost in your model

Explanation: Owen Trask identified by name as CFO controlling freeze and signature (turn 5, Dana). Owen attended the meeting (turns 67-84) and issued a conditional funding commitment in his own words (turn 84). Confirmed by multiple stakeholders across multiple turns.

45-day POV scoped by Victor on our live identity telemetry, success criteria signed by both sides — measurable credential-abuse detection and false-positive re…

I will agree to a day-3 checkpoint and we proceed on the framework Dana approved. If it doesn't, I'll tell you specifically what the gap is

Victor has to validate the POV plan first, we present my exposure and dwell numbers — the 51 days, the $22 million, the false-positive load — as the foundation…

Explanation: Decision criteria confirmed by all three key stakeholders: Dana set the gate structure (turn 9), Victor defined technical criteria including degradation model, false-positive methodology, and containment boundary (turns 31-39), and Owen stated the financial/evidence threshold explicitly (turn 84).

Victor and Priya, yes, I can move on both of those this week. Owen is conditional — help me build the quantified cost-of-delay case first, and if the numbers h…

Victor technical scoping first, Priya DPA intake in parallel, Dana review of the conservative cost-of-delay draft, Owen only after you approve the case

a 45-day POV scoped by Victor on our live identity telemetry, success criteria signed by both sides — measurable credential-abuse detection and false-positive …

Explanation: Decision process confirmed by Dana (turn 7, 11), Victor (turn 35), and Owen (turn 84). The gate sequence — Victor technical validation → Priya DPA → Dana cost-of-delay approval → Owen funding decision — was explicitly acknowledged by all three stakeholders.

I need your complete sub-processor list, not a summary, because every downstream processor touching Aperture data goes through my review independently and that…

I am going to work from Aperture's form, not redline yours — given where we are with the class-action, our outside counsel needs to see our standard processor …

Aperture's DPA form is going to my team for preparation this week. Realistic send date is end of next week.

Explanation: Priya confirmed the paper process in detail: Aperture's DPA form, sub-processor independent review, outside counsel involvement, and explicit sequencing (no data transfer until DPA executed). Confirmed by one stakeholder (Priya) across multiple turns with specificity. Not yet confirmed by a second stakeholder, hence score 2.

40 million loyalty accounts were exposed, our forensics put attacker dwell time at 51 days before we caught it, and the loaded incident cost is already trackin…

the reason we had 51 days of dwell isn't because nobody thought to look at login velocity. We had signals. The problem was correlation and prioritization

Clear that on a conservative exposure model and I will fund it out of the incident budget before the Fortalis renewal

Explanation: Pain confirmed by multiple stakeholders: Dana quantified the incident cost and operational burden (turn 5), Victor confirmed the technical root cause — correlation and prioritization failure (turn 27), and Owen acknowledged the exposure as fundable from the incident budget (turn 84).

The framing just proposed is the closest thing to a case I can actually defend that I've heard from a vendor since the breach. That is not a compliment I give …

the written summary you're offering after this call — I need that to go to Owen, Victor, Priya, and me simultaneously, because the last thing I can afford is f…

Explanation: Dana Reyes demonstrated champion behavior across multiple turns: controlled access to all stakeholders (turns 9, 15), coached the seller on framing (turn 70), advocated internally (turn 74), and orchestrated the Owen meeting with explicit accountability (turn 76). Champion was tested by the seller's request for Owen access and Dana delivered.

my incumbent SIEM, Fortalis, auto-renews in seven weeks, and if I don't have a signed alternative before that locks, I'm stuck for another year with the tool t…

Between us, their identity analytics did not flag the credential stuffing, and Victor scored their identity signals as noise, but if that shows up in your case…

Explanation: Fortalis identified as incumbent competitor by Dana (turn 5) with renewal timing as the key competitive constraint. Dana confirmed Fortalis's technical failure (turn 70). Confirmed by one stakeholder (Dana) with specificity. Victor's scoring of Fortalis signals as noise referenced by Dana but not directly confirmed by Victor in transcript.

the loaded incident cost is already tracking past $22 million when you fold in the class-action reserve — those are my numbers, not a vendor slide. Legal expos…

Explanation: Dana Reyes (named owner) stated in her own words the $22M loaded cost (number attached) and her personal accountability to the board sub-committee. The why-anything is the credential-stuffing incident creating legal, financial, and board exposure.

You've answered the integration question without overselling the connector, you've named your own failure modes before I had to find them, the degradation mode…

Explanation: Victor Salinas (named owner) confirmed differentiation in his own words — naming failure modes proactively, the two-lane degradation model, and conservative containment boundary. No specific number attached to why-us differentiation, so number_attached is false.

Explanation: Dana Reyes (named owner) stated the seven-week Fortalis auto-renewal window in her own words (number attached: seven weeks). This is the buyer-confirmed urgency driver, not a seller-manufactured deadline.

Explanation: The seller stated list price of $980K explicitly (turn 67) and never offered a discount. The seller explicitly declined to use breach pressure to manufacture a discount (turn 6: 'I'm not going to use breach pressure to manufacture a discount'). Owen's commitment (turn 84) was conditioned on evidence, not on price concession. Full price integrity maintained throughout.

The seller proposed the impact framing but never completed the A.X.I.O.M. Impact step with a buyer-confirmed dollar figure linking the operational gap (>90% FP, 11 analysts/20 capacity) to a specific incremental business cost. The $22M was the incident cost already incurred; the forward-looking cost of the gap (e.g., analyst hours × loaded rate × false-positive volume) was proposed as a model input but never quantified with buyer-confirmed numbers before the Owen meeting.

not claiming Sentinel Grid prevents all breach cost, but estimating what reduction in likelihood or detection dwell time would be financially material against …

The seller executed an unusually disciplined multi-stakeholder orchestration: respecting Dana's access control, adapting to her IR blackout with a useful async artifact (turn 46), and never contacting Victor, Priya, or Owen without introduction.

Victor was a genuine technical gatekeeper who was tested and converted — his turn 35 statement ('You've earned the telemetry assessment') is the clearest tested-champion signal in the transcript, though Dana remains the primary champion.

Owen's conditional commitment (turn 84) was issued before any POV evidence was delivered, satisfying the conditional-commitment-before-proof criterion. The condition is the POV itself, which had not yet begun.

MAP dates were buyer-acknowledged at a high level (week sequence confirmed by Dana in turns 11 and 13, Owen's 45-day POV in turn 84), but specific calendar dates were not confirmed by the buyer — hence 75% rather than 100%.

The shallow-implication failure mode fires narrowly: the seller built the framework for the cost-of-delay model but the buyer-confirmed quantification of the operational drag (analyst hours × FP rate × loaded cost) was never completed in the transcript before the Owen meeting. The $22M was historical, not forward-looking gap cost.

No discount was offered or requested at any point. Price integrity is perfect.

Priya's DPA process was engaged early and thoroughly — the seller avoided the ignored-paper-process failure mode by proactively sending data-flow documentation, pseudonymization architecture, and sub-processor detail before being asked.

Next action: [MAP dates confirmed: 11.3/15] Introduce/refresh the MAP working backward from the customer's go-live; get the next 30 days of dates confirmed in writing.

Next action: [MEDDPICC evidence: 36.7/40] Work the lowest letter (P — Paper Process, C — Competition).